Biblio
6L0WPAN is a communication protocol for Internet of Things. 6LoWPAN is IPv6 protocol modified for low power and lossy personal area networks. 6LoWPAN inherits threats from its predecessors IPv4 and IPv6. IP spoofing is a known attack prevalent in IPv4 and IPv6 networks but there are new vulnerabilities which creates new paths, leading to the attack. This study performs the experimental study to check the feasibility of performing IP spoofing attack on 6LoWPAN Network. Intruder misuses 6LoWPAN control messages which results into wrong IPv6-MAC binding in router. Attack is also simulated in cooja simulator. Simulated results are analyzed for finding cost to the attacker in terms of energy and memory consumption.
6LoWPAN networks involving wireless sensors consist of resource starving miniature sensor nodes. Since secured authentication of these resource-constrained sensors is one of the important considerations during communication, use of asymmetric key distribution scheme may not be the perfect choice to achieve secure authentication. Recent research shows that Lucky Thirteen attack has compromised Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode for key establishment. Even though EAKES6Lo and S3K techniques for key establishment follow the symmetric key establishment method, they strongly rely on a remote server and trust anchor for secure key distribution. Our proposed Lightweight Authentication Protocol (LAUP) used a symmetric key method with no preshared keys and comprised of four flights to establish authentication and session key distribution between sensors and Edge Router in a 6LoWPAN environment. Each flight uses freshly derived keys from existing information such as PAN ID (Personal Area Network IDentification) and device identities. We formally verified our scheme using the Scyther security protocol verification tool for authentication properties such as Aliveness, Secrecy, Non-Injective Agreement and Non-Injective Synchronization. We simulated and evaluated the proposed LAUP protocol using COOJA simulator with ContikiOS and achieved less computational time and low power consumption compared to existing authentication protocols such as the EAKES6Lo and SAKES.
As Internet of things (IoT) continue to ensconce into our homes, offices, hospitals, electricity grids and other walks of life, the stakes are too high to leave security to chance. IoT devices are resource constrained devices and hence it is very easy to exhaust them of their resources or deny availability. One of the most prominent attacks on the availability is the Distributed Denial of service (DDoS) attack. Although, DDoS is not a new Internet attack but a large number of new, constrained and globally accessible IoT devices have escalated the attack surface beyond imagination. This paper provides a broad anatomy of IoT protocols and their inherent weaknesses that can enable attackers to launch successful DDoS attacks. One of the major contributions of this paper is the implementation and demonstration of UDP (User Datagram Protocol) flood attack in the Contiki operating system, an open-source operating system for the IoT. This attack has been implemented and demonstrated in Cooja simulator, an inherent feature of the Contiki operating system. Furthermore, in this paper, a rate limiting mechanism is proposed that must be incorporated in the Contiki OS to mitigate UDP flood attacks. This proposed scheme reduces CPU power consumption of the victim by 9% and saves the total transmission power of the victim by 55%.