Biblio
Deep web refers to sites that cannot be found by search engines and makes up the 96% of the digital world. The dark web is the part of the deep web that can only be accessed through specialised tools and anonymity networks. To avoid monitoring and control, communities that seek for anonymization are moving to the dark web. In this work, we scrape five dark web forums and construct five graphs to model user connections. These networks are then studied and compared using data mining techniques and social network analysis tools; for each community we identify the key actors, we study the social connections and interactions, we observe the small world effect, and we highlight the type of discussions among the users. Our results indicate that only a small subset of users are influential, while the rapid dissemination of information and resources between users may affect behaviours and formulate ideas for future members.
We address the need for security requirements to take into account risks arising from complex supply chains underpinning cyber-physical infrastructures such as industrial control systems (ICS). We present SEISMiC (SEcurity Industrial control SysteM supply Chains), a framework that takes into account the whole spectrum of security risks - from technical aspects through to human and organizational issues - across an ICS supply chain. We demonstrate the effectiveness of SEISMiC through a supply chain risk assessment of Natanz, Iran's nuclear facility that was the subject of the Stuxnet attack.
Traditional security practices focus on negative incentives that attempt to force compliance through constraints, monitoring, and punishment. This paper describes a missing dimension of most organizations' insider threat defense-one that explicitly considers positive incentives for attracting individuals to act in the interests of the organization. Positive incentives focus on properties of the organizational context of workforce management practices - including those relating to organizational supportiveness, coworker connectedness, and job engagement. Without due attention to the organizational context in which insider threats occur, insider misbehaviors may simply reoccur as a natural response to counterproductive or dysfunctional management practices. A balanced combination of positive and negative incentives can improve employees' relationships with the organization and provide a means for employees to better cope with personal and professional stressors. An insider threat program that balances organizational incentives can become an advocate for the workforce and a means for improving employee work life - a welcome message to employees who feel threatened by programs focused on discovering insider wrongdoing.
Tracing and integrating security requirements throughout the development process is a key challenge in security engineering. In socio-technical systems, security requirements for the organizational and technical aspects of a system are currently dealt with separately, giving rise to substantial misconceptions and errors. In this paper, we present a model-based security engineering framework for supporting the system design on the organizational and technical level. The key idea is to allow the involved experts to specify security requirements in the languages they are familiar with: business analysts use BPMN for procedural system descriptions; system developers use UML to design and implement the system architecture. Security requirements are captured via the language extensions SecBPMN2 and UMLsec. We provide a model transformation to bridge the conceptual gap between SecBPMN2 and UMLsec. Using UMLsec policies, various security properties of the resulting architecture can be verified. In a case study featuring an air traffic management system, we show how our framework can be practically applied.
Phishing continues to remain a lucrative market for cyber criminals, mostly because of the vulnerable human element. Through emails and spoofed-websites, phishers exploit almost any opportunity using major events, considerable financial awards, fake warnings and the trusted reputation of established organizations, as a basis to gain their victims' trust. For many years, humans have often been referred to as the `weakest link' towards protecting information. To gain their victims' trust, phishers continue to use sophisticated looking emails and spoofed websites to trick them, and rely on their victims' lack of knowledge, lax security behavior and organizations' inadequate security measures towards protecting itself and their clients. As such, phishing security controls and vulnerabilities can arguably be classified into three main elements namely human factors (H), organizational aspects (O) and technological controls (T). All three of these elements have the common feature of human involvement and as such, security gaps are inevitable. Each element also functions as both security control and security vulnerability. A holistic framework towards combatting phishing is required whereby the human feature in all three of these elements is enhanced by means of a security education, training and awareness programme. This paper discusses the educational factors required to form part of a holistic framework, addressing the HOT elements as well as the relationships between these elements towards combatting phishing. The development of this framework uses the principles of design science to ensure that it is developed with rigor. Furthermore, this paper reports on the verification of the framework.