Biblio

Most security software tools try to detect malicious components by cryptographic hashes, signatures or based on their behavior. The former, is a widely adopted approach based on Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) enabling appraisal and attestation of system components. The latter, however, may induce a very long time until misbehavior of a component leads to a successful detection. Another approach is a Dynamic Runtime Attestation (DRA) based on the comparison of binary code loaded in the memory and well-known references. Since DRA is a complex approach, involving multiple related components and often complex attestation strategies, a flexible and extensible architecture is needed. In a cooperation project an architecture was designed and a Proof of Concept (PoC) successfully developed and evaluated. To achieve needed flexibility and extensibility, the implementation facilitates central components providing attestation strategies (guidelines). These guidelines define and implement the necessary steps for all relevant attestation operations, i.e. measurement, reference generation and verification.