Biblio

Passwords are generally used to keep unauthorized users out of the system. Password hacking has become more common as the number of internet users has extended, causing a slew of issues. These problems include stealing the confidential information of a company or a country by adversaries which harm the economy or the security of the organization. Hackers often use password hacking for criminal activities. It is indispensable to protect passwords from hackers. There are many hacking methods such as credential stuffing, social engineering, traffic interception, and password spraying for hacking the passwords. So, in order to control hacking, there are hashing algorithms that are mostly used to hash passwords making password cracking more difficult. In this proposed work, different hashing algorithms such as SHA-1, MD-5, Salted MD-5, SHA-256, and SHA-512 have been used. And the MySQL database is used to store the hash values of passwords that are generated using various hash functions. It is proven that SHA is better than MD-5 and Salted MD-5. Whereas in the SHA family, SHA-512 and SHA-256 have their own benefits. Four new hashing functions have been proposed using the combination of existing algorithms like SHA-256, and SHA-512 namely SHA-256\_with\_SHA-256, SHA-256\_ With\_SHA-512,SHA-512\_With\_SHA-512,and SHA-512\_ With\_SHA-256. They provide strong hash value for passwords by which the security of passwords increases, and hacking can be controlled to an extent.

Using the physical characteristics of the encryption device, an attacker can more easily obtain the key, which is called side-channel attack. Common side-channel attacks, such as simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA), mainly focus on the statistical analysis of the data involved in the encryption algorithm, while there are relatively few studies on the Hamming weight of the addresses. Therefore, a new method of address-based Hamming weight analysis, address collision attack, is proposed in this research. The collision attack method (CA) and support vector machines algorithm (SVM) are used for analysis, meanwhile, the scalar multiplication implemented by protected address-bit DPA (ADPA) can be attack on the ChipWhisperer-Pro CW1200.

This paper presents the results of a cryptographic analysis of the protocols used by the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS). A stack of three protocols secures the communication between trains and trackside equipment; encrypted radio communication is provided by the GSM-R protocol, on top of this the EuroRadio protocol provides authentication for a train control application-level protocol. We present an attack which exploits weaknesses in all three protocols: GSM-R has the same well known weaknesses as the GSM protocol, and we present a new collision attack against the EuroRadio protocol. Combined with design weaknesses in the application-level protocol, these vulnerabilities allow an attacker, who observes a MAC collision, to forge train control messages. We demonstrate this attack with a proof of concept using train control messages we have generated ourselves. Currently, ERTMS is only used to send small amounts of data for short sessions, therefore this attack does not present an immediate danger. However, if EuroRadio was to be used to transfer larger amounts of data trains would become vulnerable to this attack. Additionally, we calculate that, under reasonable assumptions, an attacker who could monitor all backend control centres in a country the size of the UK for 45 days would have a 1% chance of being able to take control of a train.

Side-channel collision attacks have been one of the most powerful attack techniques, combining advantages of traditional side-channel attack and mathematical cryptanalysis. In this paper, we propose a novel multiple-bits side-channel collision attack based on double distance voting detection, which can find all 120 relations among 16 key bytes with only 32 averaged power traces when applied to AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithm. Practical attack experiments are performed successfully on a hardware implementation of AES on FPGA board. Results show that the necessary number of traces for our method is about 50% less than correlation-enhanced collision attack and 76% less than binary voting test with 90% success rate.