Biblio
The emergence of Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS) in today's business world is still steadily progressing to new dimensions. Although they bring many new advantages to business processes and enable automation and a wider range of service capability, they also propose a variety of new challenges. One major challenge, which is introduced by such System-of-Systems (SoS), lies in the security aspect. As security may not have had that significant role in traditional embedded system engineering, a generic way to measure the level of security within an ICPS would provide a significant benefit for system engineers and involved stakeholders. Even though many security metrics and frameworks exist, most of them insufficiently consider an SoS context and the challenges of such environments. Therefore, we aim to define a security metric for ICPS, which measures the level of security during the system design, tests, and integration as well as at runtime. For this, we try to focus on a semantic point of view, which on one hand has not been considered in security metric definitions yet, and on the other hand allows us to handle the complexity of SoS architectures. Furthermore, our approach allows combining the critical characteristics of an ICPS, like uncertainty, required reliability, multi-criticality and safety aspects.
With the growing scale of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), it is challenging to maintain their stability under all operating conditions. How to reduce the downtime and locate the failures becomes a core issue in system design. In this paper, we employ a hierarchical contract-based resilience framework to guarantee the stability of CPS. In this framework, we use Assume Guarantee (A-G) contracts to monitor the non-functional properties of individual components (e.g., power and latency), and hierarchically compose such contracts to deduce information about faults at the system level. The hierarchical contracts enable rapid fault detection in large-scale CPS. However, due to the vast number of components in CPS, manually designing numerous contracts and the hierarchy becomes challenging. To address this issue, we propose a technique to automatically decompose a root contract into multiple lower-level contracts depending on I/O dependencies between components. We then formulate a multi-objective optimization problem to search the optimal parameters of each lower-level contract. This enables automatic contract refinement taking into consideration the communication overhead between components. Finally, we use a case study from the manufacturing domain to experimentally demonstrate the benefits of the proposed framework.
Mutual assured destruction is a Cold War era principle of deterrence through causing your enemy to fear that you can destroy them to at least the same extent that they can destroy you. It is based on the threat of retaliation and requires systems that can either be triggered after an enemy attack is launched and before the destructive capability is destroyed or systems that can survive an initial attack and be launched in response. During the Cold War, the weapons of mutual assured destructions were nuclear. However, with the incredible reliance on computers for everything from power generation control to banking to agriculture logistics, a cyber attack mutual assured destruction scenario is plausible. This paper presents this concept and considers the deterrent need, to prevent such a crippling attack from ever being launched, from a system of systems perspective.
With the rapid development of radio detection and wireless communication, narrowband radio-frequency interference (NB-RFI) is a serious threat for GNSS-R (global navigation satellite systems - reflectometry) receivers. However, interferometric GNSS-R (iGNSS-R) is more prone to the NB-RFIs than conventional GNSS-R (cGNSS-R), due to wider bandwidth and unclean replica. Therefore, there is strong demand of detecting and mitigating NB-RFIs for GNSS-R receivers, especially iGNSS-R receivers. Hence, focusing on working with high sampling rate and simplifying the fixed-point implementation on FPGA, this paper proposes a system design exploiting cascading IIR band-stop filters (BSFs) to suppress NB-RFIs. Furthermore, IIR BSF compared with IIR notch filter (NF) and IIR band-pass filter (BPF) is the merely choice that is able to mitigate both white narrowband interference (WNBI) and continuous wave interference (CWI) well. Finally, validation and evaluation are conducted, and then it is indicated that the system design can detect NB-RFIs and suppress WNBI and CWI effectively, which improves the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the Delay-Doppler map (DDM).
Tracing and integrating security requirements throughout the development process is a key challenge in security engineering. In socio-technical systems, security requirements for the organizational and technical aspects of a system are currently dealt with separately, giving rise to substantial misconceptions and errors. In this paper, we present a model-based security engineering framework for supporting the system design on the organizational and technical level. The key idea is to allow the involved experts to specify security requirements in the languages they are familiar with: business analysts use BPMN for procedural system descriptions; system developers use UML to design and implement the system architecture. Security requirements are captured via the language extensions SecBPMN2 and UMLsec. We provide a model transformation to bridge the conceptual gap between SecBPMN2 and UMLsec. Using UMLsec policies, various security properties of the resulting architecture can be verified. In a case study featuring an air traffic management system, we show how our framework can be practically applied.