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2018-05-09
Bobda, C., Whitaker, T. J. L., Kamhoua, C., Kwiat, K., Njilla, L..  2017.  Synthesis of Hardware Sandboxes for Trojan Mitigation in Systems on Chip. 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST). :172–172.

In this work, we propose a design flow for automatic generation of hardware sandboxes purposed for IP security in trusted system-on-chips (SoCs). Our tool CAPSL, the Component Authentication Process for Sandboxed Layouts, is capable of detecting trojan activation and nullifying possible damage to a system at run-time, avoiding complex pre-fabrication and pre-deployment testing for trojans. Our approach captures the behavioral properties of non-trusted IPs, typically from a third-party or components off the shelf (COTS), with the formalism of interface automata and the Property Specification Language's sequential extended regular expressions (SERE). Using the concept of hardware sandboxing, we translate the property specifications to checker automata and partition an untrusted sector of the system, with included virtualized resources and controllers, to isolate sandbox-system interactions upon deviation from the behavioral checkers. Our design flow is verified with benchmarks from Trust-Hub.org, which show 100% trojan detection with reduced checker overhead compared to other run-time verification techniques.

2018-02-28
Sun, C., Xi, N., Ma, J..  2017.  Enforcing Generalized Refinement-Based Noninterference for Secure Interface Composition. 2017 IEEE 41st Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC). 1:586–595.

Information flow security has been considered as a critical requirement on complicated component-based software. The recent efforts on the compositional information flow analyses were limited on the expressiveness of security lattice and the efficiency of compositional enforcement. Extending these approaches to support more general security lattices is usually nontrivial because the compositionality of information flow security properties should be properly treated. In this work, we present a new extension of interface automaton. On this interface structure, we propose two refinement-based security properties, adaptable to any finite security lattice. For each property, we present and prove the security condition that ensures the property to be preserved under composition. Furthermore, we implement the refinement algorithms and the security condition decision procedure. We demonstrate the usability and efficiency of our approach with in-depth case studies. The evaluation results show that our compositional enforcement can effectively reduce the verification cost compared with global verification on composite system.