Biblio

Honeypots have become an important tool for capturing attacks. Hybrid honeypots, including the front end and the back end, are widely used in research because of the scalability of the front end and the high interactivity of the back end. However, traditional hybrid honeypots have some problems that the flow control is difficult and topology simulation is not realistic. This paper proposes a new architecture based on SDN applied to the hybrid honeypot system for network topology simulation and attack traffic migration. Our system uses the good expansibility and controllability of the SDN controller to simulate a large and realistic network to attract attackers and redirect high-level attacks to a high-interaction honeypot for attack capture and further analysis. It improves the deficiencies in the network spoofing technology and flow control technology in the traditional honeynet. Finally, we set up the experimental environment on the mininet and verified the mechanism. The test results show that the system is more intelligent and the traffic migration is more stealthy.

In recent years, the emerging Internet-of-Things (IoT) has led to rising concerns about the security of networked embedded devices. In this work, we propose the SIPHON architecture–-a Scalable high-Interaction Honeypot platform for IoT devices. Our architecture leverages IoT devices that are physically at one location and are connected to the Internet through so-called $\backslash$emph\wormholes\ distributed around the world. The resulting architecture allows exposing few physical devices over a large number of geographically distributed IP addresses. We demonstrate the proposed architecture in a large scale experiment with 39 wormhole instances in 16 cities in 9 countries. Based on this setup, five physical IP cameras, one NVR and one IP printer are presented as 85 real IoT devices on the Internet, attracting a daily traffic of 700MB for a period of two months. A preliminary analysis of the collected traffic indicates that devices in some cities attracted significantly more traffic than others (ranging from 600 000 incoming TCP connections for the most popular destination to less than 50 000 for the least popular). We recorded over 400 brute-force login attempts to the web-interface of our devices using a total of 1826 distinct credentials, from which 11 attempts were successful. Moreover, we noted login attempts to Telnet and SSH ports some of which used credentials found in the recently disclosed Mirai malware.