Biblio

Security threats are irregular, sometimes very sophisticated, and difficult to measure in an economic sense. Much published data about them comes from either anecdotes or surveys and is often either not quantified or not quantified in a way that's comparable across organizations. It's hard even to separate the increase in actual danger from year to year from the increase in the perception of danger from year to year. Staffing to meet these threats is still more a matter of judgment than science, and in particular, optimizing staff allocation will likely leave your organization vulnerable at the worst times.

Future networks may change the way how network administrators monitor and account their users. History shows that usually a completely new design (clean slate) is used to propose a new network architecture - e.g. Network Control Protocol to TCP/IP, IPv4 to IPv6 or IP to Recursive Inter Network Architecture. The incompatibility between these architectures changes the user accounting process as network administrators have to use different information to identify a user. The paper presents a methodology how it is possible to gather all necessary information needed for smooth transition between two incompatible architectures. The transition from IPv4 and IPv6 is used as a use case, but it should be able to use the same process with any new networking architecture.
 

Threats which come from database insiders or database outsiders have formed a big challenge to the protection of integrity and confidentiality in many database systems. To overcome this situation a new domain called a Database Forensic (DBF) has been introduced to specifically investigate these dynamic threats which have posed many problems in Database Management Systems (DBMS) of many organizations. DBF is a process to identify, collect, preserve, analyse, reconstruct and document all digital evidences caused by this challenge. However, until today, this domain is still lacks having a standard and generic knowledge base for its forensic investigation methods / tools due to many issues and challenges in its complex processes. Therefore, this paper will reveal an approach adapted from a software engineering domain called metamodelling which will unify these DBF complex knowledge processes into an artifact, a metamodel (DBF Metamodel). In future, the DBF Metamodel could benefit many DBF investigation users such as database investigators, stockholders, and other forensic teams in offering various possible solutions for their problem domain.
 

Documents such as the Geneva (1949) and Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) that have clearly outlined the rules of engagement for warfare find themselves challenged by the presence of a new arena: cyber. Considering the potential nature of these offenses, operations taking place in the realm of cyber cannot simply be generalized as “cyber-warfare,” as they may also be acts of cyber-espionage, cyber-terrorism, cyber-sabaotge, etc. Cyber-attacks, such as those on Estonia in 2007, have begun to test the limits of NATO's Article 5 and the UN Charter's Article 2(4) against the use of force. What defines “force” as it relates to cyber, and what kind of response is merited in the case of uncertainty regarding attribution? In 2009, NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence commissioned a group of experts to publish a study on the application of international law to cyber-warfare. This document, the Tallinn Manual, was published in 2013 as a non-binding exercise to stimulate discussion on the codification of international law on the subject. After analysis, this paper concludes that the Tallinn Manual classifies the 2010 Stuxnet attack on Iran's nuclear program as an illegal act of force. The purpose of this paper is the following: (1) to analyze the historical and technical background of cyber-warfare, (2) to evaluate the Tallinn Manual as it relates to the justification cyber-warfare, and (3) to examine the applicability of the Tallinn Manual in a case study of a historical example of a cyber-attacks.
 

With the rapid advancement in technology and the growing complexities in the interaction of these technologies and networks, it is even more important for countries and organizations to gain sustainable security advantage. Security advantage refers to the ability to manage and respond to threats and vulnerabilities with a proactive security posture. This is accomplished through effectively planning, managing, responding to and recovering from threats and vulnerabilities. However not many organizations and even countries, especially in the developing world, have been able to equip themselves with the necessary and sufficient know-how or ability to integrate knowledge and capabilities to achieve security advantage within their environment. Having a structured set of requirements or indicators to aid in progressively attaining different levels of maturity and capabilities is one important method to determine the state of cybersecurity readiness. The research introduces the Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (CM2), a 6-step process of progressive development of cybersecurity maturity and knowledge integration that ranges from a state of limited awareness and application of security controls to pervasive optimization of the protection of critical assets.

Social networking sites (SNSs), with their large number of users and large information base, seem to be the perfect breeding ground for exploiting the vulnerabilities of people, who are considered the weakest link in security. Deceiving, persuading, or influencing people to provide information or to perform an action that will benefit the attacker is known as "social engineering." Fraudulent and deceptive people use social engineering traps and tactics through SNSs to trick users into obeying them, accepting threats, and falling victim to various crimes such as phishing, sexual abuse, financial abuse, identity theft, and physical crime. Although organizations, researchers, and practitioners recognize the serious risks of social engineering, there is a severe lack of understanding and control of such threats. This may be partly due to the complexity of human behaviors in approaching, accepting, and failing to recognize social engineering tricks. This research aims to investigate the impact of source characteristics on users' susceptibility to social engineering victimization in SNSs, particularly Facebook. Using grounded theory method, we develop a model that explains what and how source characteristics influence Facebook users to judge the attacker as credible.