Biblio

The ever-growing threats of cascading failures due to cyber-attacks pose a significant challenge to power grid security. A wrong system state estimate caused by a false data injection attack could lead to a wrong control actions and take the system into a more insecure operating condition. As a consequence, an attack-resilient failure mitigation strategy needs to be developed to correctly determine control actions to prevent the propagation of cascades. In this paper, a recovery-based model predictive control methodology is developed to eliminate power system component violations following coordinated cyber-physical attacks where physical attacks are masked by targeted false data injection attacks. Specifically, to address the problem of wrong system state estimation with compromised data, a developed methodology recovers the incorrect states from historical data rather than utilizing the tampered data, and thus allowing control centers to identify proper control actions. Additionally, instead of using a one-step method to optimize control actions, the recovery-based model predictive control methodology scheme incorporates the effect of controls over a finite time horizon and the attack detection delay to make appropriate control decisions. Case studies, performed on IEEE 30-bus and Illinois 200-bus systems, show that the developed recovery-based model predictive control methodology scheme is robust to coordinated attacks and efficient in mitigating cascades.

With the increasing interdependence of critical infrastructures, the probability of a specific infrastructure to experience a complex cyber-physical attack is increasing. Thus it is important to analyze the risk of an attack and the dynamics of its propagation in order to design and deploy appropriate countermeasures. The attack trees, commonly adopted to this aim, have inherent shortcomings in representing interdependent, concurrent and sequential attacks. To overcome this, the work presented here proposes a stochastic methodology using Petri Nets and Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) to analyze the attacks, considering the individual attack occurrence probabilities and their stochastic propagation times. A procedure to convert a basic attack tree into an equivalent CTMC is presented. The proposed method is applied in a case study to calculate the different attack propagation characteristics. The characteristics are namely, the probability of reaching the root node & sub attack nodes, the mean time to reach the root node and the mean time spent in the sub attack nodes before reaching the root node. Additionally, the method quantifies the effectiveness of specific defenses in reducing the attack risk considering the efficiency of individual defenses.

In this paper, we present an algorithm for estimating the state of the power grid following a cyber-physical attack. We assume that an adversary attacks an area by: (i) disconnecting some lines within that area (failed lines), and (ii) obstructing the information from within the area to reach the control center. Given the phase angles of the buses outside the attacked area under the AC power flow model (before and after the attack), the algorithm estimates the phase angles of the buses and detects the failed lines inside the attacked area. The novelty of our approach is the transformation of the line failures detection problem, which is combinatorial in nature, to a convex optimization problem. As a result, our algorithm can detect any number of line failures in a running time that is independent of the number of failures and is solely dependent on the size of the network. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first convex relaxation for the problem of line failures detection using phase angle measurements under the AC power flow model. We evaluate the performance of our algorithm in the IEEE 118- and 300-bus systems, and show that it estimates the phase angles of the buses with less that 1% error, and can detect the line failures with 80% accuracy for single, double, and triple line failures.

Security of control systems have become a new and important field of research since malicious attacks on control systems indeed occurred including Stuxnet in 2011 and north eastern electrical grid black out in 2003. Attacks on sensors and/or actuators of control systems cause malfunction, instability, and even system destruction. The impact of attack may differ by which instrumentation (sensors and/or actuators) is being attacked. In particular, for control systems with multiple sensors, attack on each sensor may have different impact, i.e., attack on some sensors leads to a greater damage to the system than those for other sensors. To investigate this, we consider sensor bias injection attacks in linear control systems equipped with anomaly detector, and quantify the maximum impact of attack on sensors while the attack remains undetected. Then, we introduce a notion of sensor security index for linear dynamic systems to quantify the vulnerability under sensor attacks. Method of reducing system vulnerability is also discussed using the notion of sensor security index.