Biblio

CAPTCHAs have become an ubiquitous defense used to protect open web resources from being exploited at scale. Traditionally, attackers have developed automatic programs known as CAPTCHA solvers to bypass the mechanism. With the presence of cheap labor in developing countries, hackers now have options to use human solvers. In this research, we develop a game theoretical framework to model the interactions between the defender and the attacker regarding the design and countermeasure of CAPTCHA system. With the result of equilibrium analysis, both parties can determine the optimal allocation of software-based or human-based CAPTCHA solvers. Counterintuitively, instead of the traditional wisdom of making CAPTCHA harder and harder, it may be of best interest of the defender to make CAPTCHA easier. We further suggest a welfare-improving CAPTCHA business model by involving decentralized cryptocurrency computation.

Establishing a secret and reliable wireless communication is a challenging task that is of paramount importance. In this paper, we investigate the physical layer security of a legitimate transmission link between a user that assists an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) in detecting eavesdropping and jamming attacks in the presence of an adversary that is capable of conducting an eavesdropping or a jamming attack. The user is being faced by a challenge of whether to transmit, thus becoming vulnerable to an eavesdropping or a jamming attack, or to keep silent and consequently his/her transmission will be delayed. The adversary is also facing a challenge of whether to conduct an eavesdropping or a jamming attack that will not get him/her to be detected. We model the interactions between the user and the adversary as a two-state stochastic game. Explicit solutions characterize some properties while highlighting some interesting strategies that are being embraced by the user and the adversary. Results show that our proposed system outperform current systems in terms of communication secrecy.