Visible to the public Biblio

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2018-03-26
Ashraf, Muhammed Naazer.  2017.  Scratching the Surface of Windows Server 2016 and System Center Configuration Manager Current Branch. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Annual Conference on SIGUCCS. :73–79.

Lehigh University has set a goal to implement System Center Configuration Manager by the end of 2017. This project is being spearheaded by one of our Senior Computing Consultants who has been researching and trained in the Microsoft Virtualization stack. We will discuss our roadmaps, results from our proof-of-concept environments, and discussions in driving this project.

2017-12-20
Sudhodanan, A., Carbone, R., Compagna, L., Dolgin, N., Armando, A., Morelli, U..  2017.  Large-Scale Analysis Detection of Authentication Cross-Site Request Forgeries. 2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS P). :350–365.
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks are one of the critical threats to web applications. In this paper, we focus on CSRF attacks targeting web sites' authentication and identity management functionalities. We will refer to them collectively as Authentication CSRF (Auth-CSRF in short). We started by collecting several Auth-CSRF attacks reported in the literature, then analyzed their underlying strategies and identified 7 security testing strategies that can help a manual tester uncover vulnerabilities enabling Auth-CSRF. In order to check the effectiveness of our testing strategies and to estimate the incidence of Auth-CSRF, we conducted an experimental analysis considering 300 web sites belonging to 3 different rank ranges of the Alexa global top 1500. The results of our experiments are alarming: out of the 300 web sites we considered, 133 qualified for conducting our experiments and 90 of these suffered from at least one vulnerability enabling Auth-CSRF (i.e. 68%). We further generalized our testing strategies, enhanced them with the knowledge we acquired during our experiments and implemented them as an extension (namely CSRF-checker) to the open-source penetration testing tool OWASP ZAP. With the help of CSRFchecker, we tested 132 additional web sites (again from the Alexa global top 1500) and identified 95 vulnerable ones (i.e. 72%). Our findings include serious vulnerabilities among the web sites of Microsoft, Google, eBay etc. Finally, we responsibly disclosed our findings to the affected vendors.
2015-05-04
Teufl, P., Fitzek, A., Hein, D., Marsalek, A., Oprisnik, A., Zefferer, T..  2014.  Android encryption systems. Privacy and Security in Mobile Systems (PRISMS), 2014 International Conference on. :1-8.

The high usability of smartphones and tablets is embraced by consumers as well as the corporate and public sector. However, especially in the non-consumer area the factor security plays a decisive role for the platform-selection process. All of the current companies within the mobile device sector added a wide range of security features to the initially consumer-oriented devices (Apple, Google, Microsoft), or have dealt with security as a core feature from the beginning (RIM, now Blackerry). One of the key security features for protecting data on the device or in device backups are encryption systems, which are available in the majority of current devices. However, even under the assumption that the systems are implemented correctly, there is a wide range of parameters, specific use cases, and weaknesses that need to be considered when deploying mobile devices in security-critical environments. As the second part in a series of papers (the first part was on iOS), this work analyzes the deployment of the Android platform and the usage of its encryption systems within a security-critical context. For this purpose, Android's different encryption systems are assessed and their susceptibility to different attacks is analyzed in detail. Based on these results a workflow is presented, which supports deployment of the Android platform and usage of its encryption systems within security-critical application scenarios.

2015-04-30
El Masri, A., Wechsler, H., Likarish, P., Kang, B.B..  2014.  Identifying users with application-specific command streams. Privacy, Security and Trust (PST), 2014 Twelfth Annual International Conference on. :232-238.

This paper proposes and describes an active authentication model based on user profiles built from user-issued commands when interacting with GUI-based application. Previous behavioral models derived from user issued commands were limited to analyzing the user's interaction with the *Nix (Linux or Unix) command shell program. Human-computer interaction (HCI) research has explored the idea of building users profiles based on their behavioral patterns when interacting with such graphical interfaces. It did so by analyzing the user's keystroke and/or mouse dynamics. However, none had explored the idea of creating profiles by capturing users' usage characteristics when interacting with a specific application beyond how a user strikes the keyboard or moves the mouse across the screen. We obtain and utilize a dataset of user command streams collected from working with Microsoft (MS) Word to serve as a test bed. User profiles are first built using MS Word commands and identification takes place using machine learning algorithms. Best performance in terms of both accuracy and Area under the Curve (AUC) for Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is reported using Random Forests (RF) and AdaBoost with random forests.