Visible to the public Biblio

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2020-11-02
Lin, Chun-Yu, Huang, Juinn-Dar, Yao, Hailong, Ho, Tsung-Yi.  2018.  A Comprehensive Security System for Digital Microfluidic Biochips. 2018 IEEE International Test Conference in Asia (ITC-Asia). :151—156.

Digital microfluidic biochips (DMFBs) have become popular in the healthcare industry recently because of its lowcost, high-throughput, and portability. Users can execute the experiments on biochips with high resolution, and the biochips market therefore grows significantly. However, malicious attackers exploit Intellectual Property (IP) piracy and Trojan attacks to gain illegal profits. The conventional approaches present defense mechanisms that target either IP piracy or Trojan attacks. In practical, DMFBs may suffer from the threat of being attacked by these two attacks at the same time. This paper presents a comprehensive security system to protect DMFBs from IP piracy and Trojan attacks. We propose an authentication mechanism to protect IP and detect errors caused by Trojans with CCD cameras. By our security system, we could generate secret keys for authentication and determine whether the bioassay is under the IP piracy and Trojan attacks. Experimental results demonstrate the efficacy of our security system without overhead of the bioassay completion time.

Shayan, Mohammed, Bhattacharjee, Sukanta, Song, Yong-Ak, Chakrabarty, Krishnendu, Karri, Ramesh.  2019.  Deceive the Attacker: Thwarting IP Theft in Sieve-Valve-based Biochips. 2019 Design, Automation Test in Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE). :210—215.

Researchers develop bioassays following rigorous experimentation in the lab that involves considerable fiscal and highly-skilled-person-hour investment. Previous work shows that a bioassay implementation can be reverse engineered by using images or video and control signals of the biochip. Hence, techniques must be devised to protect the intellectual property (IP) rights of the bioassay developer. This study is the first step in this direction and it makes the following contributions: (1) it introduces use of a sieve-valve as a security primitive to obfuscate bioassay implementations; (2) it shows how sieve-valves can be used to obscure biochip building blocks such as multiplexers and mixers; (3) it presents design rules and security metrics to design and measure obfuscated biochips. We assess the cost-security trade-offs associated with this solution and demonstrate practical sieve-valve based obfuscation on real-life biochips.

2020-07-30
Liang, Tung-Che, Chakrabarty, Krishnendu, Karri, Ramesh.  2019.  Programmable Daisychaining of Microelectrodes for IP Protection in MEDA Biochips. 2019 IEEE International Test Conference (ITC). :1—10.

As digital microfluidic biochips (DMFBs) make the transition to the marketplace for commercial exploitation, security and intellectual property (IP) protection are emerging as important design considerations. Recent studies have shown that DMFBs are vulnerable to reverse engineering aimed at stealing biomolecular protocols (IP theft). The IP piracy of proprietary protocols may lead to significant losses for pharmaceutical and biotech companies. The micro-electrode-dot-array (MEDA) is a next-generation DMFB platform that supports real-time sensing of droplets and has the added advantage of important security protections. However, real-time sensing offers opportunities to an attacker to steal the biochemical IP. We show that the daisychaining of microelectrodes and the use of one-time-programmability in MEDA biochips provides effective bitstream scrambling of biochemical protocols. To examine the strength of this solution, we develop a SAT attack that can unscramble the bitstreams through repeated observations of bioassays executed on the MEDA platform. Based on insights gained from the SAT attack, we propose an advanced defense against IP theft. Simulation results using real-life biomolecular protocols confirm that while the SAT attack is effective for simple instances, our advanced defense can thwart it for realistic MEDA biochips and real-life protocols.

Shayan, Mohammed, Bhattacharjee, Sukanta, Song, Yong-Ak, Chakrabarty, Krishnendu, Karri, Ramesh.  2019.  Can Multi-Layer Microfluidic Design Methods Aid Bio-Intellectual Property Protection? 2019 IEEE 25th International Symposium on On-Line Testing and Robust System Design (IOLTS). :151—154.
Researchers develop bioassays by rigorously experimenting in the lab. This involves significant fiscal and skilled person-hour investment. A competitor can reverse engineer a bioassay implementation by imaging or taking a video of a biochip when in use. Thus, there is a need to protect the intellectual property (IP) rights of the bioassay developer. We introduce a novel 3D multilayer-based obfuscation to protect a biochip against reverse engineering.
2020-02-26
Gountia, Debasis, Roy, Sudip.  2019.  Checkpoints Assignment on Cyber-Physical Digital Microfluidic Biochips for Early Detection of Hardware Trojans. 2019 3rd International Conference on Trends in Electronics and Informatics (ICOEI). :16–21.

Present security study involving analysis of manipulation of individual droplets of samples and reagents by digital microfluidic biochip has remarked that the biochip design flow is vulnerable to piracy attacks, hardware Trojans attacks, overproduction, Denial-of-Service attacks, and counterfeiting. Attackers can introduce bioprotocol manipulation attacks against biochips used for medical diagnosis, biochemical analysis, and frequent diseases detection in healthcare industry. Among these attacks, hardware Trojans have created a major threatening issue in its security concern with multiple ways to crack the sensitive data or alter original functionality by doing malicious operations in biochips. In this paper, we present a systematic algorithm for the assignment of checkpoints required for error-recovery of available bioprotocols in case of hardware Trojans attacks in performing operations by biochip. Moreover, it can guide the placement and timing of checkpoints so that the result of an attack is reduced, and hence enhance the security concerns of digital microfluidic biochips. Comparative study with traditional checkpoint schemes demonstrate the superiority of the proposed algorithm without overhead of the bioprotocol completion time with higher error detection accuracy.