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2021-01-22
Sahabandu, D., Allen, J., Moothedath, S., Bushnell, L., Lee, W., Poovendran, R..  2020.  Quickest Detection of Advanced Persistent Threats: A Semi-Markov Game Approach. 2020 ACM/IEEE 11th International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS). :9—19.
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are stealthy, sophisticated, long-term, multi-stage attacks that threaten the security of sensitive information. Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) has been proposed as a promising mechanism to detect and prevent various cyber attacks in computer systems. DIFT tracks suspicious information flows in the system and generates security analysis when anomalous behavior is detected. The number of information flows in a system is typically large and the amount of resources (such as memory, processing power and storage) required for analyzing different flows at different system locations varies. Hence, efficient use of resources is essential to maintain an acceptable level of system performance when using DIFT. On the other hand, the quickest detection of APTs is crucial as APTs are persistent and the damage caused to the system is more when the attacker spends more time in the system. We address the problem of detecting APTs and model the trade-off between resource efficiency and quickest detection of APTs. We propose a game model that captures the interaction of APT and a DIFT-based defender as a two-player, multi-stage, zero-sum, Stackelberg semi-Markov game. Our game considers the performance parameters such as false-negatives generated by DIFT and the time required for executing various operations in the system. We propose a two-time scale Q-learning algorithm that converges to a Stackelberg equilibrium under infinite horizon, limiting average payoff criteria. We validate our model and algorithm on a real-word attack dataset obtained using Refinable Attack INvestigation (RAIN) framework.
2020-08-03
Chowdhary, Ankur, Sengupta, Sailik, Alshamrani, Adel, Huang, Dijiang, Sabur, Abdulhakim.  2019.  Adaptive MTD Security using Markov Game Modeling. 2019 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC). :577–581.
Large scale cloud networks consist of distributed networking and computing elements that process critical information and thus security is a key requirement for any environment. Unfortunately, assessing the security state of such networks is a challenging task and the tools used in the past by security experts such as packet filtering, firewall, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) etc., provide a reactive security mechanism. In this paper, we introduce a Moving Target Defense (MTD) based proactive security framework for monitoring attacks which lets us identify and reason about multi-stage attacks that target software vulnerabilities present in a cloud network. We formulate the multi-stage attack scenario as a two-player zero-sum Markov Game (between the attacker and the network administrator) on attack graphs. The rewards and transition probabilities are obtained by leveraging the expert knowledge present in the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). Our framework identifies an attacker's optimal policy and places countermeasures to ensure that this attack policy is always detected, thus forcing the attacker to use a sub-optimal policy with higher cost.
2020-01-20
Nicho, Mathew, McDermott, Christopher D..  2019.  Dimensions of ‘Socio’ Vulnerabilities of Advanced Persistent Threats. 2019 International Conference on Software, Telecommunications and Computer Networks (SoftCOM). :1–5.
Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) are highly targeted and sophisticated multi-stage attacks, utilizing zero day or near zero-day malware. Directed at internetworked computer users in the workplace, their growth and prevalence can be attributed to both socio (human) and technical (system weaknesses and inadequate cyber defenses) vulnerabilities. While many APT attacks incorporate a blend of socio-technical vulnerabilities, academic research and reported incidents largely depict the user as the prominent contributing factor that can weaken the layers of technical security in an organization. In this paper, our objective is to explore multiple dimensions of socio factors (non-technical vulnerabilities) that contribute to the success of APT attacks in organizations. Expert interviews were conducted with senior managers, working in government and private organizations in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over a period of four years (2014 to 2017). Contrary to common belief that socio factors derive predominately from user behavior, our study revealed two new dimensions of socio vulnerabilities, namely the role of organizational management, and environmental factors which also contribute to the success of APT attacks. We show that the three dimensions postulated in this study can assist Managers and IT personnel in organizations to implement an appropriate mix of socio-technical countermeasures for APT threats.
2015-04-30
Kholidy, H.A., Erradi, A., Abdelwahed, S., Azab, A..  2014.  A Finite State Hidden Markov Model for Predicting Multistage Attacks in Cloud Systems. Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing (DASC), 2014 IEEE 12th International Conference on. :14-19.

Cloud computing significantly increased the security threats because intruders can exploit the large amount of cloud resources for their attacks. However, most of the current security technologies do not provide early warnings about such attacks. This paper presents a Finite State Hidden Markov prediction model that uses an adaptive risk approach to predict multi-staged cloud attacks. The risk model measures the potential impact of a threat on assets given its occurrence probability. The attacks prediction model was integrated with our autonomous cloud intrusion detection framework (ACIDF) to raise early warnings about attacks to the controller so it can take proactive corrective actions before the attacks pose a serious security risk to the system. According to our experiments on DARPA 2000 dataset, the proposed prediction model has successfully fired the early warning alerts 39.6 minutes before the launching of the LLDDoS1.0 attack. This gives the auto response controller ample time to take preventive measures.