Biblio

Due to the computing capability limitation of the Internet of things devices in the perception layer, the traditional security solutions are difficult to be used directly. How to design a new lightweight, secure and reliable protocol suitable for the Internet of Things application environment, and realize the secure transmission of information among many sensing checkpoints is an urgent problem to be solved. In this paper, we propose a decentralized lightweight authentication key protocol based on the combination of public key and trusted computing technology, which is used to establish secure communication between nodes in the perception layer. The various attacks that the protocol may suffer are analyzed, and the formal analysis method is used to verify the security of the protocol. To verify the validity of the protocol, the computation and communication cost of the protocol are compared with the existing key protocols. And the results show that the protocol achieved the promised performance.

A strong designated verifier signature (SDVS) is a variation of traditional digital signatures, since it allows a signer to designate an intended receiver as the verifier rather than anyone. To do this, a signer must incorporate the verifier's public key with the signing procedure such that only the intended receiver could verify this signature with his/her private key. Such a signature further enables a designated verifier to simulate a computationally indistinguishable transcript intended for himself. Consequently, no one can identify the real signer's identity from a candidate signer and a designated verifier, which is referred to as the property of signer ambiguity. A strong notion of signer ambiguity states that no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish the real signer of a given SDVS that is not received by the designated verifier, even if the adversary has obtained the signer's private key. In 2013, Islam and Biswas proposed a provably secure certificateless strong designated verifier signature (CL-SDVS) scheme based on bilinear pairings. In this paper, we will demonstrate that their scheme fails to satisfy strong signer ambiguity and must assume a trusted private key generator (PKG). In other words, their CL-SDVS scheme is vulnerable to both key-compromise and malicious PKG attacks. Additionally, we present an improved variant to eliminate these weaknesses.