Biblio

Mobile Ad-hoc NETwork (MANET) is a collection of mobile devices which interchange information without the use of predefined infrastructures or central administration. It is employed in many domains such as military and commercial sectors, data and sensors networks, low level applications, etc. The important constraints in this network are the limitation of bandwidth, processing capabilities and battery life. The choice of an effective routing protocol is primordial. From many routing protocols developed for MANET, OLSR protocol is a widely-used proactive routing protocol which diffuses topological information periodically. Thus, every node has a global vision of the entire network. The protocol assumes, like the other protocols, that the nodes cooperate in a trusted environment. So, all control messages are transmitted (HELLO messages) to all 1-hop neighbor nodes or broadcasted (TC and MID messages) to the entire network in clear. However, a node, which listens to OLSR control messages, can exploit this property to lead an attack. In this paper, we investigate on MultiPoint Relay (MPR) attack considered like one of the efficient OLSR attacks by using a simulation in progressive size gridMANET.

Smart grid is a cyber-physical system that integrates power infrastructures with information technologies. To facilitate efficient information exchange, wireless networks have been proposed to be widely used in the smart grid. However, the jamming attack that constantly broadcasts radio interference is a primary security threat to prevent the deployment of wireless networks in the smart grid. Hence, spread spectrum systems, which provide jamming resilience via multiple frequency and code channels, must be adapted to the smart grid for secure wireless communications, while at the same time providing latency guarantee for control messages. An open question is how to minimize message delay for timely smart grid communication under any potential jamming attack. To address this issue, we provide a paradigm shift from the case-by-case methodology, which is widely used in existing works to investigate well-adopted attack models, to the worst-case methodology, which offers delay performance guarantee for smart grid applications under any attack. We first define a generic jamming process that characterizes a wide range of existing attack models. Then, we show that in all strategies under the generic process, the worst-case message delay is a U-shaped function of network traffic load. This indicates that, interestingly, increasing a fair amount of traffic can in fact improve the worst-case delay performance. As a result, we demonstrate a lightweight yet promising system, transmitting adaptive camouflage traffic (TACT), to combat jamming attacks. TACT minimizes the message delay by generating extra traffic called camouflage to balance the network load at the optimum. Experiments show that TACT can decrease the probability that a message is not delivered on time in order of magnitude.