Biblio

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) has been popularized in many scenarios such as e-government applications, enterprises, etc. Due to the construction of PKI system of various regions and departments, there formed a lot of isolated PKI management domains, cross-domain authentication has become a problem that cannot ignored, which also has some traditional solutions such as cross-authentication, trust list, etc. However, some issues still exist, which hinder the popularity of unified trust services. For example, lack of unified cross domain standard, the update period of Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is too long, which affects the security of cross-domain authentication. In this paper, we proposed a trust transferring model by using blockchain consensus instead of traditional trusted third party for e-government applications. We exploit how to solve the unified trust service problem of PKI at the national level through consensus and transfer some CA management functions to the blockchain. And we prove the scheme's feasibility from engineering perspective. Besides, the scheme has enough scalability to satisfy trust transfer requirements of multiple PKI systems. Meanwhile, the security and efficiency are also guaranteed compared with traditional solutions.

Currently, no major browser fully checks for TLS/SSL certificate revocations. This is largely due to the fact that the deployed mechanisms for disseminating revocations (CRLs, OCSP, OCSP Stapling, CRLSet, and OneCRL) are each either incomplete, insecure, inefficient, slow to update, not private, or some combination thereof. In this paper, we present CRLite, an efficient and easily-deployable system for proactively pushing all TLS certificate revocations to browsers. CRLite servers aggregate revocation information for all known, valid TLS certificates on the web, and store them in a space-efficient filter cascade data structure. Browsers periodically download and use this data to check for revocations of observed certificates in real-time. CRLite does not require any additional trust beyond the existing PKI, and it allows clients to adopt a fail-closed security posture even in the face of network errors or attacks that make revocation information temporarily unavailable. We present a prototype of name that processes TLS certificates gathered by Rapid7, the University of Michigan, and Google's Certificate Transparency on the server-side, with a Firefox extension on the client-side. Comparing CRLite to an idealized browser that performs correct CRL/OCSP checking, we show that CRLite reduces latency and eliminates privacy concerns. Moreover, CRLite has low bandwidth costs: it can represent all certificates with an initial download of 10 MB (less than 1 byte per revocation) followed by daily updates of 580 KB on average. Taken together, our results demonstrate that complete TLS/SSL revocation checking is within reach for all clients.