Biblio

In VANETs, pseudonyms are often used to replace the identity of vehicles in communication. When vehicles drive out of the network or misbehave, their pseudonym certificates need to be revoked by the certificate authority (CA). The certificate revocation lists (CRLs) are usually used to store the revoked certificates before their expiration. However, using CRLs would incur additional storage, communication and computation overhead. Some existing schemes have proposed to use Bloom Filter to compress the original CRLs, but they are unable to delete the expired certificates and introduce the false positive problem. In this paper, we propose an improved pseudonym certificates revocation scheme, using Cuckoo Filter for compression to reduce the impact of these problems. In order to optimize deletion efficiency, we propose the concept of Certificate Expiration List (CEL) which can be implemented with priority queue. The experimental results show that our scheme can effectively reduce the storage and communication overhead of pseudonym certificates revocation, while retaining moderately low false positive rates. In addition, our scheme can also greatly improve the lookup performance on CRLs, and reduce the revocation operation costs by allowing deletion.

Currently, no major browser fully checks for TLS/SSL certificate revocations. This is largely due to the fact that the deployed mechanisms for disseminating revocations (CRLs, OCSP, OCSP Stapling, CRLSet, and OneCRL) are each either incomplete, insecure, inefficient, slow to update, not private, or some combination thereof. In this paper, we present CRLite, an efficient and easily-deployable system for proactively pushing all TLS certificate revocations to browsers. CRLite servers aggregate revocation information for all known, valid TLS certificates on the web, and store them in a space-efficient filter cascade data structure. Browsers periodically download and use this data to check for revocations of observed certificates in real-time. CRLite does not require any additional trust beyond the existing PKI, and it allows clients to adopt a fail-closed security posture even in the face of network errors or attacks that make revocation information temporarily unavailable. We present a prototype of name that processes TLS certificates gathered by Rapid7, the University of Michigan, and Google's Certificate Transparency on the server-side, with a Firefox extension on the client-side. Comparing CRLite to an idealized browser that performs correct CRL/OCSP checking, we show that CRLite reduces latency and eliminates privacy concerns. Moreover, CRLite has low bandwidth costs: it can represent all certificates with an initial download of 10 MB (less than 1 byte per revocation) followed by daily updates of 580 KB on average. Taken together, our results demonstrate that complete TLS/SSL revocation checking is within reach for all clients.