Biblio

The development of a robust strategy for network security is reliant upon a combination of in-house expertise and for completeness attack vectors used by attackers. A honeypot is one of the most popular mechanisms used to gather information about attacks and attackers. However, low-interaction honeypots only emulate an operating system and services, and are more prone to a fingerprinting attack, resulting in severe consequences such as revealing the identity of the honeypot and thus ending the usefulness of the honeypot forever, or worse, enabling it to be converted into a bot used to attack others. A number of tools and techniques are available both to fingerprint low-interaction honeypots and to defend against such fingerprinting; however, there is an absence of fingerprinting techniques to identify the characteristics and behaviours that indicate fingerprinting is occurring. Therefore, this paper proposes a fuzzy technique to correlate the attack actions and predict the probability that an attack is a fingerprinting attack on the honeypot. Initially, an experimental assessment of the fingerprinting attack on the low- interaction honeypot is performed, and a fingerprinting detection mechanism is proposed that includes the underlying principles of popular fingerprinting attack tools. This implementation is based on a popular and commercially available low-interaction honeypot for Windows - KFSensor. However, the proposed fuzzy technique is a general technique and can be used with any low-interaction honeypot to aid in the identification of the fingerprinting attack whilst it is occurring; thus protecting the honeypot from the fingerprinting attack and extending its life.

Digital fingerprinting refers to as method that can assign each copy of an intellectual property (IP) a distinct fingerprint. It was introduced for the purpose of protecting legal and honest IP users. The unique fingerprint can be used to identify the IP or a chip that contains the IP. However, existing fingerprinting techniques are not practical due to expensive cost of creating fingerprints and the lack of effective methods to verify the fingerprints. In the paper, we study a practical scan chain based fingerprinting method, where the digital fingerprint is generated by selecting the Q-SD or Q'-SD connection during the design of scan chains. This method has two major advantages. First, fingerprints are created as a post-silicon procedure and therefore there will be little fabrication overhead. Second, altering the Q-SD or Q'-SD connection style requires the modification of test vectors for each fingerprinted IP in order to maintain the fault coverage. This enables us to verify the fingerprint by inspecting the test vectors without opening up the chip to check the Q-SD or Q'-SD connection styles. We perform experiment on standard benchmarks to demonstrate that our approach has low design overhead. We also conduct security analysis to show that such fingerprints are robust against various attacks.