Biblio
Named data network (NDN) is one of the most promising information-centric networking architectures, where the core concept is to focus on the named data (or contents) themselves. Users in NDN can easily send a request packet to get the desired content regardless of its address. The routers in NDN have cache functionality to make the users instantly retrieve the desired file. Thus, the user can immediately get the desired file from the nearby nodes instead of the remote host. Nevertheless, NDN is a novel proposal and there are still some open issues to be resolved. In view of previous research, it is a challenge to achieve access control on a specific user and support potential receivers simultaneously. In order to solve it, we present a fine-grained access control mechanism tailored for NDN, supporting data confidentiality, potential receivers, and mobility. Compared to previous works, this is the first to support fine-grained access control and potential receivers. Furthermore, the proposed scheme achieves provable security under the DBDH assumption.
NDN has been widely regarded as a promising representation and implementation of information- centric networking (ICN) and serves as a potential candidate for the future Internet architecture. However, the security of NDN is threatened by a significant safety hazard known as an IFA, which is an evolution of DoS and distributed DoS attacks on IP-based networks. The IFA attackers can create numerous malicious interest packets into a named data network to quickly exhaust the bandwidth of communication channels and cache capacity of NDN routers, thereby seriously affecting the routers' ability to receive and forward packets for normal users. Accurate detection of the IFAs is the most critical issue in the design of a countermeasure. To the best of our knowledge, the existing IFA countermeasures still have limitations in terms of detection accuracy, especially for rapidly volatile attacks. This article proposes a TC to detect the distributions of normal and malicious interest packets in the NDN routers to further identify the IFA. The trace back method is used to prevent further attempts. The simulation results show the efficiency of the TC for mitigating the IFAs and its advantages over other typical IFA countermeasures.
The Named Data Network (NDN) is a promising network paradigm for content distribution based on caching. However, it may put consumer privacy at risk, as the adversary may identify the content, the name and the signature (namely a certificate) through side-channel timing responses from the cache of the routers. The adversary may identify the content name and the consumer node by distinguishing between cached and un- cached contents. In order to mitigate the timing attack, effective countermeasure methods have been proposed by other authors, such as random caching, random freshness, and probabilistic caching. In this work, we have implemented a timing attack scenario to evaluate the efficiency of these countermeasures and to demonstrate how the adversary can be detected. For this goal, a brute force timing attack scenario based on a real topology was developed, which is the first brute force attack model applied in NDN. Results show that the adversary nodes can be effectively distinguished from other legitimate consumers during the attack period. It is also proposed a multi-level mechanism to detect an adversary node. Through this approach, the content distribution performance can be mitigated against the attack.
Named Data Networking (NDN) is one of the most promising data-centric networks. NDN is resilient to most of the attacks that are possible in TCP/IP stack. Since NDN has different network architecture than TCP/IP, so it is prone to new types of attack. These attacks are Interest Flooding Attack (IFA), Cache Privacy Attack, Cache Pollution Attack, Content Poisoning Attack, etc. In this paper, we discussed the detection of IFA. First, we model the IFA on linear topology using the ndnSIM and CCNx code base. We have selected most promising feature among all considered features then we applied diïňĂerent machine learning techniques to detect the attack. We have shown that result of attack detection in case of simulation and implementation is almost same. We modeled IFA on DFN topology and compared the results of different machine learning approaches.