Biblio

Blockchain, the technology behind the popular Bitcoin, is considered a "security by design" system as it is meant to create security among a group of distrustful parties yet without a central trusted authority. The security of blockchain relies on the premise of honest-majority, namely, the blockchain system is assumed to be secure as long as the majority of consensus voting power is honest. And in the case of proof-of-work (PoW) blockchain, adversaries cannot control more than 50% of the network's gross computing power. However, this 50% threshold is based on the analysis of computing power only, with implicit and idealistic assumptions on the network and node behavior. Recent researches have alluded that factors such as network connectivity, presence of blockchain forks, and mining strategy could undermine the consensus security assured by the honest-majority, but neither concrete analysis nor quantitative evaluation is provided. In this paper we fill the gap by proposing an analytical model to assess the impact of network connectivity on the consensus security of PoW blockchain under different adversary models. We apply our analytical model to two adversarial scenarios: 1) honest-but-potentially-colluding, 2) selfish mining. For each scenario, we quantify the communication capability of nodes involved in a fork race and estimate the adversary's mining revenue and its impact on security properties of the consensus protocol. Simulation results validated our analysis. Our modeling and analysis provide a paradigm for assessing the security impact of various factors in a distributed consensus system.

Security is a key concern in Internet of Things (IoT) designs. In a heterogeneous and complex environment, service providers and service requesters must trust each other. On-off attack is a sophisticated trust threat in which a malicious device can perform good and bad services randomly to avoid being rated as a low trust node. Some countermeasures demands prior level of trust knowing and time to classify a node behavior. In this paper, we introduce a Smart Middleware that automatically assesses the IoT resources trust, evaluating service providers attributes to protect against On-off attacks.

Mobile Ad-hoc Networks are dynamic in nature and do not have fixed infrastructure to govern nodes in the networks. The mission lies ahead in coordinating among such dynamically shifting nodes. The root problem of identifying and isolating misbehaving nodes that refuse to forward packets in multi-hop ad hoc networks is solved by the development of a comprehensive system called Audit-based Misbehavior Detection (AMD) that can efficiently isolates selective and continuous packet droppers. AMD evaluates node behavior on a per-packet basis, without using energy-expensive overhearing techniques or intensive acknowledgment schemes. Moreover, AMD can detect selective dropping attacks even in end-to-end encrypted traffic and can be applied to multi-channel networks. Game theoretical approaches are more suitable in deciding upon the reward mechanisms for which the mobile nodes operate upon. Rewards or penalties have to be decided by ensuring a clean and healthy MANET environment. A non-routine yet surprise alterations are well required in place in deciding suitable and safe reward strategies. This work focuses on integrating a Audit-based Misbehaviour Detection (AMD)scheme and an incentive based reputation scheme with game theoretical approach called Supervisory Game to analyze the selfish behavior of nodes in the MANETs environment. The proposed work GAMD significantly reduces the cost of detecting misbehavior nodes in the network.

Wireless sensor network operate on the basic underlying assumption that all participating nodes fully collaborate in self-organizing functions. However, performing network functions consumes energy and other resources. Therefore, some network nodes may decide against cooperating with others. Node misbehavior due to selfish or malicious reasons or faulty nodes can significantly degrade the performance of mobile ad-hoc networks. To cope with misbehavior in such self-organized networks, nodes need to be able to automatically adapt their strategy to changing levels of cooperation. The problem of identifying and isolating misbehaving nodes that refuses to forward packets in multi-hop ad hoc networks. a comprehensive system called Audit-based Misbehavior Detection (AMD) that effectively and efficiently isolates both continuous and selective packet droppers. The AMD system integrates reputation management, trustworthy route discovery, and identification of misbehaving nodes based on behavioral audits. AMD evaluates node behavior on a per-packet basis, without employing energy-expensive overhearing techniques or intensive acknowledgment schemes. AMD can detect selective dropping attacks even if end-to-end traffic is encrypted and can be applied to multi-channel networks.