Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Keyword is wireless interfaces  [Clear All Filters]
2020-07-20
Boumiza, Safa, Braham, Rafik.  2019.  An Anomaly Detector for CAN Bus Networks in Autonomous Cars based on Neural Networks. 2019 International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications (WiMob). :1–6.
The domain of securing in-vehicle networks has attracted both academic and industrial researchers due to high danger of attacks on drivers and passengers. While securing wired and wireless interfaces is important to defend against these threats, detecting attacks is still the critical phase to construct a robust secure system. There are only a few results on securing communication inside vehicles using anomaly-detection techniques despite their efficiencies in systems that need real-time detection. Therefore, we propose an intrusion detection system (IDS) based on Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) neural network for Controller Area Networks (CAN) bus. This IDS divides data according to the ID field of CAN packets using K-means clustering algorithm, then it extracts suitable features and uses them to train and construct the neural network. The proposed IDS works for each ID separately and finally it combines their individual decisions to construct the final score and generates alert in the presence of attack. The strength of our intrusion detection method is that it works simultaneously for two types of attacks which will eliminate the use of several separate IDS and thus reduce the complexity and cost of implementation.
2018-08-23
Cheah, M., Bryans, J., Fowler, D. S., Shaikh, S. A..  2017.  Threat Intelligence for Bluetooth-Enabled Systems with Automotive Applications: An Empirical Study. 2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks Workshops (DSN-W). :36–43.

Modern vehicles are opening up, with wireless interfaces such as Bluetooth integrated in order to enable comfort and safety features. Furthermore a plethora of aftermarket devices introduce additional connectivity which contributes to the driving experience. This connectivity opens the vehicle to potentially malicious attacks, which could have negative consequences with regards to safety. In this paper, we survey vehicles with Bluetooth connectivity from a threat intelligence perspective to gain insight into conditions during real world driving. We do this in two ways: firstly, by examining Bluetooth implementation in vehicles and gathering information from inside the cabin, and secondly, using war-nibbling (general monitoring and scanning for nearby devices). We find that as the vehicle age decreases, the security (relatively speaking) of the Bluetooth implementation increases, but that there is still some technological lag with regards to Bluetooth implementation in vehicles. We also find that a large proportion of vehicles and aftermarket devices still use legacy pairing (and are therefore more insecure), and that these vehicles remain visible for sufficient time to mount an attack (assuming some premeditation and preparation). We demonstrate a real-world threat scenario as an example of the latter. Finally, we provide some recommendations on how the security risks we discover could be mitigated.