Visible to the public Biblio

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2020-07-16
Gariano, John, Djordjevic, Ivan B..  2019.  Covert Communications-Based Information Reconciliation for Quantum Key Distribution Protocols. 2019 21st International Conference on Transparent Optical Networks (ICTON). :1—5.

The rate at which a secure key can be generated in a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is limited by the channel loss and the quantum bit-error rate (QBER). Increases to the QBER can stem from detector noise, channel noise, or the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. Eve is capable of obtaining information of the unsecure key by performing an attack on the quantum channel or by listening to all discussion performed via a noiseless public channel. Conventionally a QKD protocol will perform the information reconciliation over the authenticated public channel, revealing the parity bits used to correct for any quantum bit errors. In this invited paper, the possibility of limiting the information revealed to Eve during the information reconciliation is considered. Using a covert communication channel for the transmission of the parity bits, secure key rates are possible at much higher QBERs. This is demonstrated through the simulation of a polarization based QKD system implementing the BB84 protocol, showing significant improvement of the SKRs over the conventional QKD protocols.

2019-11-25
Weng, Jian-Jian, Alajaji, Fady, Linder, Tamás.  2019.  Joint Source-Channel Coding for the Transmission of Correlated Sources over Two-Way Channels. 2019 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT). :1322–1326.
A joint source-channel coding (JSCC) scheme based on hybrid digital/analog coding is proposed for the transmission of correlated sources over discrete-memoryless two-way channels (DM-TWCs). The scheme utilizes the correlation between the sources in generating channel inputs, thus enabling the users to coordinate their transmission to combat channel noise. The hybrid scheme also subsumes prior coding methods such as rate-one separate source-channel coding and uncoded schemes for two-way lossy transmission, as well as the correlation-preserving coding scheme for (almost) lossless transmission. Moreover, we derive a distortion outer bound for the source-channel system using a genie-aided argument. A complete JSSC theorem for a class of correlated sources and DM-TWCs whose capacity region cannot be enlarged via interactive adaptive coding is also established. Examples that illustrate the theorem are given.
2018-10-26
Subramani, K. S., Antonopoulos, A., Abotabl, A. A., Nosratinia, A., Makris, Y..  2017.  INFECT: INconspicuous FEC-based Trojan: A hardware attack on an 802.11a/g wireless network. 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST). :90–94.

We discuss the threat that hardware Trojans (HTs) impose on wireless networks, along with possible remedies for mitigating the risk. We first present an HT attack on an 802.11a/g transmitter (TX), which exploits Forward Error Correction (FEC) encoding. While FEC seeks to protect the transmitted signal against channel noise, it often offers more protection than needed by the actual channel. This margin is precisely where our HT finds room to stage an attack. We, then, introduce a Trojan-agnostic method which can be applied at the receiver (RX) to detect such attacks. This method monitors the noise distribution, to identify systematic inconsistencies which may be caused by an HT. Lastly, we describe a Wireless open-Access Research Platform (WARP) based experimental setup to investigate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed attack and defense. More specifically, we evaluate (i) the ability of a rogue RX to extract the leaked information, while an unsuspecting, legitimate RX accurately recovers the original message and remains oblivious to the attack, and (ii) the ability of channel noise profiling to detect the presence of the HT.