Biblio

Smart grid (SG) network is one of the recently improved networks of tangled entities, objects, and smart metering infrastructure (SMI). It plays a vital part in sensing, acquiring, observing, aggregating, controlling, and dealing with various kinds of fields in SG. The SMI or advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is proposed to make available a real-time transmissions connection among users and services are Time of use (TOU), Real time pricing (RTP), Critical Peak Pricing (CPP). In adding to, additional benefit of SMs is which are capable to report back to the service control center in near real time nontechnical losses (for instance, tampering with meters, bypassing meters, and illicit tapping into distribution systems). SMI supports two-way transmission meters reading electrical utilization at superior frequency. This data is treated in real time and signals send to manage demand. This paper expresses a transitory impression of cyberattack instances in customary energy networks and SMI. This paper presents cyber security attacks and countermeasures in Smart Grid Metering Network (SGMN). Based on the existing survey threat models, a number of proposed ways have been planned to deal with all threats in the formulation of the secrecy and privacy necessities of SG measurement network.

Due to the rise of huge population in mankind and the large variety of upcoming utilization of power, the energy requirement has substantially increased. Smart Grid is a very important part of the Smart Cities initiative and is one of the crucial components in distribution and reconciliation of energy. Security of the smart grid infrastructure, which is an integral part of the smart grid framework, intended at transitioning the conventional power grid system into a robust, reliable, adaptable and intelligent energy utility, is an impending problem that needs to be arrested quickly. With the increasingly intensifying integration of smart devices in the smart grid infrastructure with other interconnected applications and the communication backbone is compelling both the energy users and the energy utilities to thoroughly look into the privacy and security issues of the smart grid. In this paper, we present challenges of the existing security mechanisms deployed in the smart grid framework and we tried to bring forward the unresolved problems that would highlight the security aspects of Smart Grid as a challenging area of research and development in the future.

By applying power usage statistics from smart meters, users are able to save energy in their homes or control smart appliances via home automation systems. However, owing to security and privacy concerns, it is recommended that smart meters (SM) should not have direct communication with smart appliances. In this paper, we propose a design for a smart meter gateway (SMGW) associated with a two-phase authentication mechanism and key management scheme to link a smart grid with smart appliances. With placement of the SMGW, we can reduce the design complexity of SMs as well as enhance the strength of security.

Electrical Distribution Networks face new challenges by the Smart Grid deployment. The required metering infrastructures add new vulnerabilities that need to be taken into account in order to achieve Smart Grid functionalities without considerable reliability trade-off. In this paper, a qualitative assessment of the cyber attack impact on the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is initially attempted. Attack simulations have been conducted on a realistic Grid topology. The simulated network consisted of Smart Meters, routers and utility servers. Finally, the impact of Denial-of-Service and Distributed Denial-of-Service (DoS/DDoS) attacks on distribution system reliability is discussed through a qualitative analysis of reliability indices.
 

Electrical Distribution Networks face new challenges by the Smart Grid deployment. The required metering infrastructures add new vulnerabilities that need to be taken into account in order to achieve Smart Grid functionalities without considerable reliability trade-off. In this paper, a qualitative assessment of the cyber attack impact on the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is initially attempted. Attack simulations have been conducted on a realistic Grid topology. The simulated network consisted of Smart Meters, routers and utility servers. Finally, the impact of Denial-of-Service and Distributed Denial-of-Service (DoS/DDoS) attacks on distribution system reliability is discussed through a qualitative analysis of reliability indices.