Biblio
Security issues severely restrict the development and popularization of cloud computing. As a way of data leakage, covert channel greatly threatens the security of cloud platform. This paper introduces the types and research status of covert channels, and discusses the classical detection and interference methods of time-covert channels on cloud platforms for shared memory time covert channels.
Recently, data protection has become increasingly important in cloud environments. The cloud platform has global user information, rich storage resource allocation information, and a fuller understanding of data attributes. At the same time, there is an urgent need for data access control to provide data security, and software-defined network, as a ready-made facility, has a global network view, global network management capabilities, and programable network rules. In this paper, we present an approach, named High-Performance Software-Defined Data Access Network (HP-SDDAN), providing software-defined data access network architecture, global data attribute management and attribute-based data access network. HP-SDDAN combines the excellent features of cloud platform and software-defined network, and fully considers the performance to implement software-defined data access network. In evaluation, we verify the effectiveness and efficiency of HP-SDDAN implementation, with only 1.46% overhead to achieve attribute-based data access control of attribute-based differential privacy.
Information centric network (ICN) based Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) network has drawn growing attentions in recent years. The distributed network architecture brings new security problems, especially the identity security problem. Because of the cloud platform deployed on the edge of the MEC network, multiple channel attributes can be easily obtained and processed. Thus this paper proposes a multiple channel attributes based spoofing detection mechanism. To further reduce the complexity, we also propose an improved clustering algorithm. The simulation results indicate that the proposed spoofing detection method can provide near-optimal performance with extremely low complexity.
Data privacy and security is a leading concern for providers and customers of cloud computing, where Virtual Machines (VMs) can co-reside within the same underlying physical machine. Side channel attacks within multi-tenant virtualized cloud environments are an established problem, where attackers are able to monitor and exfiltrate data from co-resident VMs. Virtualization services have attempted to mitigate such attacks by preventing VM-to-VM interference on shared hardware by providing logical resource isolation between co-located VMs via an internal virtual network. However, such approaches are also insecure, with attackers capable of performing network channel attacks which bypass mitigation strategies using vectors such as ARP Spoofing, TCP/IP steganography, and DNS poisoning. In this paper we identify a new vulnerability within the internal cloud virtual network, showing that through a combination of TAP impersonation and mirroring, a malicious VM can successfully redirect and monitor network traffic of VMs co-located within the same physical machine. We demonstrate the feasibility of this attack in a prominent cloud platform - OpenStack - under various security requirements and system conditions, and propose countermeasures for mitigation.