Biblio

In this talk, we discuss how control theory can contribute to the analysis and design of secure cyber-physical systems. We start by reviewing conditions for undetectable false-data injection attacks on feedback control systems. In particular, we highlight how a physical understanding of the controlled process can guide us in the allocation of protective measures. We show that protecting only a few carefully selected actuators or sensors can give indirect protection to many more components. We then illustrate how such analysis is exploited in the design of a resilient control scheme for a microgrid energy management system.

Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) security testbeds serve as a platform for evaluating and validating novel CPS security tools and technologies, accelerating the transition of state-of-the-art research to industrial practice. The engineering of CPS security testbeds requires significant investments in money, time and modeling efforts to provide a scalable, high-fidelity, real-time attack-defense platform. Therefore, there is a strong need in academia and industry to create remotely accessible testbeds that support a range of use-cases pertaining to CPS security of the grid, including vulnerability assessments, impact analysis, product testing, attack-defense exercises, and operator training. This paper describes the implementation architecture, and capabilities of a remote access and experimental orchestration framework developed for the PowerCyber CPS security testbed at Iowa State University (ISU). The paper then describes several engineering challenges in the development of such remotely accessible testbeds for Smart Grid CPS security experimentation. Finally, the paper provides a brief case study with some screenshots showing a particular use case scenario on the remote access framework.

The reliability theory used in the design of complex systems including electric grids assumes random component failures and is thus unsuited to analyzing security risks due to attackers that intentionally damage several components of the system. In this paper, a security risk analysis methodology is proposed consisting of vulnerability analysis and impact analysis. Vulnerability analysis is a method developed by security engineers to identify the attacks that are relevant for the system under study, and in this paper, the analysis is applied on the communications network topology of the electric grid automation system. Impact analysis is then performed through co-simulation of automation and the electric grid to assess the potential damage from the attacks. This paper makes an extensive review of vulnerability and impact analysis methods and relevant system modeling techniques from the fields of security and industrial automation engineering, with a focus on smart grid automation, and then applies and combines approaches to obtain a security risk analysis methodology. The methodology is demonstrated with a case study of fault location, isolation and supply restoration smart grid automation.