Biblio
Filters: Keyword is code-based cryptography [Clear All Filters]
.
2019. Cryptanalysis of a One-Time Code-Based Digital Signature Scheme. 2019 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT). :2594–2598.
We consider a one-time digital signature scheme recently proposed by Persichetti and show that a successful key recovery attack can be mounted with limited complexity. The attack we propose exploits a single signature intercepted by the attacker, and relies on a statistical analysis performed over such a signature, followed by information set decoding. We assess the attack complexity and show that a full recovery of the secret key can be performed with a work factor that is far below the claimed security level. The efficiency of the attack is motivated by the sparsity of the signature, which leads to a significant information leakage about the secret key.
.
2019. Code-Based Schemes for Post-Quantum Digital Signatures. 2019 10th IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Data Acquisition and Advanced Computing Systems: Technology and Applications (IDAACS). 2:707–712.
The paper deals with the design and principles of functioning of code-based schemes for formation and verification of electronic digital signature. Comparative studies of the effectiveness of the known CFS scheme and the proposed scheme have been carried out, as well as their possibilities, disadvantages and prospects for use in the post-quantum period.
.
2018. Survey on Cryptanalysis of Code-Based Cryptography: From Theoretical to Physical Attacks. 2018 7th International Conference on Computers Communications and Control (ICCCC). :215-223.
Nowadays public-key cryptography is based on number theory problems, such as computing the discrete logarithm on an elliptic curve or factoring big integers. Even though these problems are considered difficult to solve with the help of a classical computer, they can be solved in polynomial time on a quantum computer. Which is why the research community proposed alternative solutions that are quantum-resistant. The process of finding adequate post-quantum cryptographic schemes has moved to the next level, right after NIST's announcement for post-quantum standardization. One of the oldest quantum-resistant proposition goes back to McEliece in 1978, who proposed a public-key cryptosystem based on coding theory. It benefits of really efficient algorithms as well as a strong mathematical background. Nonetheless, its security has been challenged many times and several variants were cryptanalyzed. However, some versions remain unbroken. In this paper, we propose to give some background on coding theory in order to present some of the main flawless in the protocols. We analyze the existing side-channel attacks and give some recommendations on how to securely implement the most suitable variants. We also detail some structural attacks and potential drawbacks for new variants.