Biblio

The advantage of cryptographic systems based on elliptical curves over traditional systems is that they provide equivalent protection even when the key length used is small. This reduces the load time of the processors of the receiving and transmitting devices. But the development of computer technology leads to an increase in the stability of the cryptosystem, that is, the length of the keys. This article presents a method for converting elliptic curve equations to hidden parameter elliptic curve equations to increase stability without increasing key length.

The advantage of elliptic curve (EC) cryptographic systems is that they provide equivalent security even with small key lengths. However, the development of modern computing technologies leads to an increase in the length of keys. In this case, it is recommended to use a secret parameter to ensure sufficient access without increasing the key length. To achieve this result, the initiation of an additional secret parameter R into the EC equation is used to develop an EC-based key distribution algorithm. The article describes the algebraic structure of an elliptic curve with a secret parameter.

This article describes a new way to generate and distribute secret encryption keys, in which the processes of generating a public key and formicating a secret encryption key are performed in algebra with a parameter, the secrecy of which provides increased durability of the key.

In this work, we will present a new hybrid cryptography method based on two hard problems: 1- The problem of the discrete logarithm on an elliptic curve defined on a finite local ring. 2- The closest vector problem in lattice and the conjugate problem on square matrices. At first, we will make the exchange of keys to the Diffie-Hellman. The encryption of a message is done with a bad basis of a lattice.

Nowadays public-key cryptography is based on number theory problems, such as computing the discrete logarithm on an elliptic curve or factoring big integers. Even though these problems are considered difficult to solve with the help of a classical computer, they can be solved in polynomial time on a quantum computer. Which is why the research community proposed alternative solutions that are quantum-resistant. The process of finding adequate post-quantum cryptographic schemes has moved to the next level, right after NIST's announcement for post-quantum standardization. One of the oldest quantum-resistant proposition goes back to McEliece in 1978, who proposed a public-key cryptosystem based on coding theory. It benefits of really efficient algorithms as well as a strong mathematical background. Nonetheless, its security has been challenged many times and several variants were cryptanalyzed. However, some versions remain unbroken. In this paper, we propose to give some background on coding theory in order to present some of the main flawless in the protocols. We analyze the existing side-channel attacks and give some recommendations on how to securely implement the most suitable variants. We also detail some structural attacks and potential drawbacks for new variants.