Biblio
A blockchain is a distributed ledger forming a distributed consensus on a history of transactions, and is the underlying technology for the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. However, its applications are far beyond the financial sector. The transaction verification process for cryptocurrencies is much slower than traditional digital transaction systems. One approach to increase transaction speed and scalability is to identify a solution that offers faster Proof of Work. In this paper, we propose a method for accelerating the process of Proof of Work based on parallel mining rather than solo mining. The goal is to ensure that no more than two or more miners put the same effort into solving a specific block. The proposed method includes a process for selection of a manager, distribution of work and a reward system. This method has been implemented in a test environment that contains all the characteristics needed to perform Proof of Work for Bitcoin and has been tested, using a variety of case scenarios, by varying the difficulty level and number of validators. Preliminary results show improvement in the scalability of Proof of Work up to 34% compared to the current system.
Proof-of-work (PoW) is an algorithmic tool used to secure networks by imposing a computational cost on participating devices. Unfortunately, traditional PoW schemes require that correct devices perform computational work perpetually, even when the system is not under attack. We address this issue by designing a general PoW protocol that ensures two properties. First, the network stays secure. In particular, the fraction of identities in the system that are controlled by an attacker is always less than 1/2. Second, our protocol's computational cost is commensurate with the cost of an attacker. That is, the total computational cost of correct devices is a linear function of the attacker's computational cost plus the number of correct devices that have joined the system. Consequently, if the network is attacked, we ensure security, with cost that grows linearly with the attacker's cost; and, in the absence of attack, our computational cost is small. We prove similar guarantees for bandwidth cost. Our results hold in a dynamic, decentralized system where participants join and depart over time, and where the total computational power of the attacker is up to a constant fraction of the total computational power of correct devices. We show how to leverage our results to address important security problems in distributed computing including: Sybil attacks, Byzantine Consensus, and Committee Election.