Biblio

This paper evaluates two algorithms, BLIP and JLT, for creating differentially private data sketches of user profiles, in terms of their ability to protect a kNN collaborative filtering algorithm from an inference attack by third-parties. The transformed user profiles are employed in a user-based top-N collaborative filtering system. For the first time, a theoretical analysis of the BLIP is carried out, to derive expressions that relate its parameters to its performance. This allows the two techniques to be fairly compared. The impact of deploying these approaches on the utility of the system—its ability to make good recommendations, and on its privacy level—the ability of third-parties to make inferences about the underlying user preferences, is examined. An active inference attack is evaluated, that consists of the injection of a number of tailored sybil profiles into the system database. User profile data of targeted users is then inferred from the recommendations made to the sybils. Although the differentially private sketches are designed to allow the transformed user profiles to be published without compromising privacy, the attack we examine does not use such information and depends only on some pre-existing knowledge of some user preferences as well as the neighbourhood size of the kNN algorithm. Our analysis therefore assesses in practical terms a relatively weak privacy attack, which is extremely simple to apply in systems that allow low-cost generation of sybils. We find that, for a given differential privacy level, the BLIP injects less noise into the system, but for a given level of noise, the JLT offers a more compact representation.