Biblio

Bitcoin P2P networking is especially vulnerable to networking threats because it is permissionless and does not have the security protections based on the trust in identities, which enables the attackers to manipulate the identities for Sybil and spoofing attacks. The Bitcoin node keeps track of its peer’s networking misbehaviors through ban scores. In this paper, we investigate the security problems of the ban-score mechanism and discover that the ban score is not only ineffective against the Bitcoin Message-based DoS (BM-DoS) attacks but also vulnerable to the Defamation attack as the network adversary can exploit the ban score to defame innocent peers. To defend against these threats, we design an anomaly detection approach that is effective, lightweight, and tailored to the networking threats exploiting Bitcoin’s ban-score mechanism. We prototype our threat discoveries against a real-world Bitcoin node connected to the Bitcoin Mainnet and conduct experiments based on the prototype implementation. The experimental results show that the attacks have devastating impacts on the targeted victim while being cost-effective on the attacker side. For example, an attacker can ban a peer in two milliseconds and reduce the victim’s mining rate by hundreds of thousands of hash computations per second. Furthermore, to counter the threats, we empirically validate our detection countermeasure’s effectiveness and performances against the BM-DoS and Defamation attacks.

With the progress over technology, it is becoming viable to set up mobile ad hoc networks for non-military services as like well. Examples consist of networks of cars, law about communication facilities into faraway areas, and exploiting the solidity between urban areas about present nodes such as cellular telephones according to offload or otherwise keep away from using base stations. In such networks, there is no strong motive according to assume as the nodes cooperate. Some nodes may also be disruptive and partial may additionally attempt according to save sources (e.g. battery power, memory, CPU cycles) through “selfish” behavior. The proposed method focuses on the robustness of packet forwarding: keeping the usual packet throughput over a mobile ad hoc network in the rear regarding nodes that misbehave at the routing layer. Proposed system listen at the routing layer or function no longer try after address attacks at lower layers (eg. jamming the network channel) and passive attacks kind of eavesdropping. Moreover such functionate now not bear together with issues kind of node authentication, securing routes, or message encryption. Proposed solution addresses an orthogonal problem the encouragement concerning proper routing participation.