Biblio

Automatic test systems designed to validate the performance of military and aerospace products have always been held to a higher standard; moreover, emerging threats to data security and instrumentation integrity continue to raise this bar. Engineers are faced with growing pressure to not only ensure that the unit under test (UUT) meets all design criteria, but that it remains safe from malicious attacks aimed at gaining access to test parameters or results, controlling of test sequences and functionality, downloading malware, or impacting functionality by way of counterfeit parts installed in instrumentation. This paper will delve into the cybersecurity issue from the perspective of the test development environment, including the use of test executives, and the challenges associated with minimizing impact to data integrity and access to control. An undetected data breach on military / aerospace automated test equipment (ATE) holds significance beyond just the test system, since mission critical electronics associated with avionics, radar, electronic warfare and missile assemblies must also be protected. One topic discussed will be the impact of adopting methods and procedures detailed in the Department of Defense's (DoD) Application Security Technical Implementation Guide, which is based on NIST documents and details how to manage and maintain a secure software-based system such as an ATE system. Another aspect of cybersecurity that is often overlooked in the world of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) instrumentation and switching systems is the potential impact on the UUT from substandard counterfeit parts and those embedded with malware. Concerns with counterfeit material can encompass a range of threats including the re-purposing of used parts and new knockoff parts with substandard operating characteristics represented and sold as new hardware. One of the most concerning aspects, parts intentionally infected with malware, can pose a significant risk to personnel and national security. We will discuss various strategies aimed at countering these threats, including the adoption of policies and procedures outlined in AS9100D and AS5553, which can mitigate these risks.

For modern Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) one of the most daunting tasks is now Information Assurance (IA). What was once at most a secondary item consisting mainly of installing an Anti-Virus suite is now becoming one of the most important aspects of ATE. Given the current climate of IA it has become important to ensure ATE is kept safe from any breaches of security or loss of information. Even though most ATE are not on the Internet (or even on a network for many) they are still vulnerable to some of the same attack vectors plaguing common computers and other electronic devices. This paper will discuss some of the processes and procedures which must be used to ensure that modern ATE can continue to be used to test and detect faults in the systems they are designed to test. The common items that must be considered for ATE are as follows: The ATE system must have some form of Anti-Virus (as should all computers). The ATE system should have a minimum software footprint only providing the software needed to perform the task. The ATE system should be verified to have all the Operating System (OS) settings configured pursuant to the task it is intended to perform. The ATE OS settings should include password and password expiration settings to prevent access by anyone not expected to be on the system. The ATE system software should be written and constructed such that it in itself is not readily open to attack. The ATE system should be designed in a manner such that none of the instruments in the system can easily be attacked. The ATE system should insure any paths to the outside world (such as Ethernet or USB devices) are limited to only those required to perform the task it was designed for. These and many other common configuration concerns will be discussed in the paper.