Biblio

Mobile ad-hoc network (MANETS) is generally appropriate in different territories like military tactical network, educational, home and entertainment and emergency operations etc. The MANETSs are simply the disintegration and designing kind of system in this portable hubs coming up and out the system whenever. Because of decentralized creation of the network, security, routing and Standard of service are the three noteworthy issues. MANETSs are helpless against security attack in light of the decentralized validation. The mobile hubs can enter or out the system and at some point malicious hubs enter the system, which are capable to trigger different dynamic and inactive attack. The flooding attack is the dynamic sort of attack in which malicious hubs transfers flooding packets on the medium. Because of this, medium gets over-burden and packets drop may happen inside the system. This decreases the throughput and increased packet loss. In this paper we illustrated different techniques and proposed various methods responsible for flooding attack. Our commitment in this paper is that we have investigated various flooding attacks in MANETs, their detection techniques with performance measure parameters.

Heterogeneous Networks (Het Nets) are introduced to fulfill the increasing demands of wireless communications. To be manageable, it is expected that these networks are self-organized and in particular, self-healing to detect and relief faults autonomously. In the Cooperative Cell Outage Detection (COD), the Macro-Base Station (MBS) and a group of Femto-Base Stations (FBSs) in a specific range are cooperatively communicating to find out if each FBS is working properly or not. In this paper, we discuss the impacts of the cooperation range on the detection delay and accuracy and then conclude that there is an optimal amount for cooperation range which maximizes detection accuracy. We then derive the optimal cooperative range that improves the detection accuracy by using network parameters such as FBS's transmission power, noise power, shadowing fading factor, and path-loss exponent and investigate the impacts of these parameters on the optimal cooperative range. The simulation results show the optimal cooperative range that we proposed maximizes the detection accuracy.

This paper studies the physical layer security performance of a Simultaneous Wireless Information and Power Transfer (SWIPT) millimeter wave (mmWave) ultra-dense network under a stochastic geometry framework. Specifically, we first derive the energy-information coverage probability and secrecy probability in the considered system under time switching policies. Then the effective secrecy throughput (EST) which can characterize the trade-off between the energy coverage, secure and reliable transmission performance is derived. Theoretical analyses and simulation results reveal the design insights into the effects of various network parameters like, transmit power, time switching factor, transmission rate, confidential information rate, etc, on the secrecy performance. Specifically, it is impossible to realize the effective secrecy throughput improvement just by increasing the transmit power.

Integrated cyber-physical systems (CPSs), such as the smart grid, are becoming the underpinning technology for major industries. A major concern regarding such systems are the seemingly unexpected large scale failures, which are often attributed to a small initial shock getting escalated due to intricate dependencies within and across the individual counterparts of the system. In this paper, we develop a novel interdependent system model to capture this phenomenon, also known as cascading failures. Our framework consists of two networks that have inherently different characteristics governing their intra-dependency: i) a cyber-network where a node is deemed to be functional as long as it belongs to the largest connected (i.e., giant) component; and ii) a physical network where nodes are given an initial flow and a capacity, and failure of a node results with redistribution of its flow to the remaining nodes, upon which further failures might take place due to overloading. Furthermore, it is assumed that these two networks are inter-dependent. For simplicity, we consider a one-to-one interdependency model where every node in the cyber-network is dependent upon and supports a single node in the physical network, and vice versa. We provide a thorough analysis of the dynamics of cascading failures in this interdependent system initiated with a random attack. The system robustness is quantified as the surviving fraction of nodes at the end of cascading failures, and is derived in terms of all network parameters involved. Analytic results are supported through an extensive numerical study. Among other things, these results demonstrate the ability of our model to capture the unexpected nature of large-scale failures, and provide insights on improving system robustness.