Biblio
Deep learning is a highly effective machine learning technique for large-scale problems. The optimization of nonconvex functions in deep learning literature is typically restricted to the class of first-order algorithms. These methods rely on gradient information because of the computational complexity associated with the second derivative Hessian matrix inversion and the memory storage required in large scale data problems. The reward for using second derivative information is that the methods can result in improved convergence properties for problems typically found in a non-convex setting such as saddle points and local minima. In this paper we introduce TRMinATR - an algorithm based on the limited memory BFGS quasi-Newton method using trust region - as an alternative to gradient descent methods. TRMinATR bridges the disparity between first order methods and second order methods by continuing to use gradient information to calculate Hessian approximations. We provide empirical results on the classification task of the MNIST dataset and show robust convergence with preferred generalization characteristics.
Todays analyzing web weaknesses and vulnerabilities in order to find security attacks has become more urgent. In case there is a communication contrary to the system security policies, a covert channel has been created. The attacker can easily disclosure information from the victim's system with just one public access permission. Covert timing channels, unlike covert storage channels, do not have memory storage and they draw less attention. Different methods have been proposed for their identification, which generally benefit from the shape of traffic and the channel's regularity. In this article, an entropy-based detection method is designed and implemented. The attacker can adjust the amount of channel entropy by controlling measures such as changing the channel's level or creating noise on the channel to protect from the analyst's detection. As a result, the entropy threshold is not always constant for detection. By comparing the entropy from different levels of the channel and the analyst, we conclude that the analyst must investigate traffic at all possible levels.