Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Keyword is target defense  [Clear All Filters]
2021-01-25
Yoon, S., Cho, J.-H., Kim, D. S., Moore, T. J., Free-Nelson, F., Lim, H..  2020.  Attack Graph-Based Moving Target Defense in Software-Defined Networks. IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management. 17:1653–1668.
Moving target defense (MTD) has emerged as a proactive defense mechanism aiming to thwart a potential attacker. The key underlying idea of MTD is to increase uncertainty and confusion for attackers by changing the attack surface (i.e., system or network configurations) that can invalidate the intelligence collected by the attackers and interrupt attack execution; ultimately leading to attack failure. Recently, the significant advance of software-defined networking (SDN) technology has enabled several complex system operations to be highly flexible and robust; particularly in terms of programmability and controllability with the help of SDN controllers. Accordingly, many security operations have utilized this capability to be optimally deployed in a complex network using the SDN functionalities. In this paper, by leveraging the advanced SDN technology, we developed an attack graph-based MTD technique that shuffles a host's network configurations (e.g., MAC/IP/port addresses) based on its criticality, which is highly exploitable by attackers when the host is on the attack path(s). To this end, we developed a hierarchical attack graph model that provides a network's vulnerability and network topology, which can be utilized for the MTD shuffling decisions in selecting highly exploitable hosts in a given network, and determining the frequency of shuffling the hosts' network configurations. The MTD shuffling with a high priority on more exploitable, critical hosts contributes to providing adaptive, proactive, and affordable defense services aiming to minimize attack success probability with minimum MTD cost. We validated the out performance of the proposed MTD in attack success probability and MTD cost via both simulation and real SDN testbed experiments.
2019-09-09
Zhang, Z., Yu, Q., Njilla, L., Kamhoua, C..  2018.  FPGA-oriented moving target defense against security threats from malicious FPGA tools. 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST). :163–166.
The imbalance relationship between FPGA hardware/software providers and FPGA users challenges the assurance of secure design on FPGAs. Existing efforts on FPGA security primarily focus on reverse engineering the downloaded FPGA configuration, retrieving the authentication code or crypto key stored on the embedded memory in FPGAs, and countermeasures for the security threats above. In this work, we investigate new security threats from malicious FPGA tools, and identify stealthy attacks that could occur during FPGA deployment. To address those attacks, we exploit the principles of moving target defense (MTD) and propose a FPGA-oriented MTD (FOMTD) method. Our method is composed of three defense lines, which are formed by an improved user constraint file, random selection of design replicas, and runtime submodule assembling, respectively. The FPGA emulation results show that the proposed FOMTD method reduces the hardware Trojan hit rate by 60% over the baseline, at the cost of 10.76% more power consumption.