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2021-03-15
Piessens, F..  2020.  Security across abstraction layers: old and new examples. 2020 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS PW). :271–279.
A common technique for building ICT systems is to build them as successive layers of bstraction: for instance, the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) is an abstraction of the hardware, and compilers or interpreters build higher level abstractions on top of the ISA.The functionality of an ICT application can often be understood by considering only a single level of abstraction. For instance the source code of the application defines the functionality using the level of abstraction of the source programming language. Functionality can be well understood by just studying this source code.Many important security issues in ICT system however are cross-layer issues: they can not be understood by considering the system at a single level of abstraction, but they require understanding how multiple levels of abstraction are implemented. Attacks may rely on, or exploit, implementation details of one or more layers below the source code level of abstraction.The purpose of this paper is to illustrate this cross-layer nature of security by discussing old and new examples of cross-layer security issues, and by providing a classification of these issues.
2019-09-26
Pfeffer, T., Herber, P., Druschke, L., Glesner, S..  2018.  Efficient and Safe Control Flow Recovery Using a Restricted Intermediate Language. 2018 IEEE 27th International Conference on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises (WETICE). :235-240.

Approaches for the automatic analysis of security policies on source code level cannot trivially be applied to binaries. This is due to the lacking high-level semantics of low-level object code, and the fundamental problem that control-flow recovery from binaries is difficult. We present a novel approach to recover the control-flow of binaries that is both safe and efficient. The key idea of our approach is to use the information contained in security mechanisms to approximate the targets of computed branches. To achieve this, we first define a restricted control transition intermediate language (RCTIL), which restricts the number of possible targets for each branch to a finite number of given targets. Based on this intermediate language, we demonstrate how a safe model of the control flow can be recovered without data-flow analyses. Our evaluation shows that that makes our solution more efficient than existing solutions.