Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Keyword is code-reuse attack  [Clear All Filters]
2022-06-06
Lin, Kunli, Xia, Haojun, Zhang, Kun, Tu, Bibo.  2021.  AddrArmor: An Address-based Runtime Code-reuse Attack Mitigation for Shared Objects at the Binary-level. 2021 IEEE Intl Conf on Parallel Distributed Processing with Applications, Big Data Cloud Computing, Sustainable Computing Communications, Social Computing Networking (ISPA/BDCloud/SocialCom/SustainCom). :117–124.
The widespread adoption of DEP has made most modern attacks follow the same general steps: Attackers try to construct code-reuse attacks by using vulnerable indirect branch instructions in shared objects after successful exploits on memory vulnerabilities. In response to code-reuse attacks, researchers have proposed a large number of defenses. However, most of them require access to source code and/or specific hardware features. These limitations hinder the deployment of these defenses much.In this paper, we propose an address-based code-reuse attack mitigation for shared objects at the binary-level. We emphasize that the execution of indirect branch instruction must follow several principles we propose. More specifically, we first reconstruct function boundaries at the program’s dynamic-linking stage by combining shared object’s dynamic symbols with binary-level instruction analysis. We then leverage static instrumentation to hook vulnerable indirect branch instructions to a novel target address computation and validation routine. At runtime, AddrArmor will protect against code-reuse attacks based on the computed target address.Our experimental results show that AddrArmor provides a strong line of defense against code reuse attacks, and has an acceptable performance overhead of about 6.74% on average using SPEC CPU 2006.
2022-03-14
Nurmukhametov, Alexey, Vishnyakov, Alexey, Logunova, Vlada, Kurmangaleev, Shamil.  2021.  MAJORCA: Multi-Architecture JOP and ROP Chain Assembler. 2021 Ivannikov Ispras Open Conference (ISPRAS). :37–46.
Nowadays, exploits often rely on a code-reuse approach. Short pieces of code called gadgets are chained together to execute some payload. Code-reuse attacks can exploit vul-nerabilities in the presence of operating system protection that prohibits data memory execution. The ROP chain construction task is the code generation for the virtual machine defined by an exploited executable. It is crucial to understand how powerful ROP attacks can be. Such knowledge can be used to improve software security. We implement MAJORCA that generates ROP and JOP payloads in an architecture agnostic manner and thoroughly consider restricted symbols such as null bytes that terminate data copying via strcpy. The paper covers the whole code-reuse payloads construction pipeline: cataloging gadgets, chaining them in DAG, scheduling, linearizing to the ready-to-run payload. MAJORCA automatically generates both ROP and JOP payloads for x86 and MIPS. MAJORCA constructs payloads respecting restricted symbols both in gadget addresses and data. We evaluate MAJORCA performance and accuracy with rop-benchmark and compare it with open-source compilers. We show that MAJORCA outperforms open-source tools. We propose a ROP chaining metric and use it to estimate the probabilities of successful ROP chaining for different operating systems with MAJORCA as well as other ROP compilers to show that ROP chaining is still feasible. This metric can estimate the efficiency of OS defences.
2021-04-08
Wang, P., Zhang, J., Wang, S., Wu, D..  2020.  Quantitative Assessment on the Limitations of Code Randomization for Legacy Binaries. 2020 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS P). :1–16.
Software development and deployment are generally fast-pacing practices, yet to date there is still a significant amount of legacy software running in various critical industries with years or even decades of lifespans. As the source code of some legacy software became unavailable, it is difficult for maintainers to actively patch the vulnerabilities, leaving the outdated binaries appealing targets of advanced security attacks. One of the most powerful attacks today is code reuse, a technique that can circumvent most existing system-level security facilities. While there have been various countermeasures against code reuse, applying them to sourceless software appears to be exceptionally challenging. Fine-grained code randomization is considered to be an effective strategy to impede modern code-reuse attacks. To apply it to legacy software, a technique called binary rewriting is employed to directly reconstruct binaries without symbol or relocation information. However, we found that current rewriting-based randomization techniques, regardless of their designs and implementations, share a common security defect such that the randomized binaries may remain vulnerable in certain cases. Indeed, our finding does not invalidate fine-grained code randomization as a meaningful defense against code reuse attacks, for it significantly raises the bar for exploits to be successful. Nevertheless, it is critical for the maintainers of legacy software systems to be aware of this problem and obtain a quantitative assessment of the risks in adopting a potentially incomprehensive defense. In this paper, we conducted a systematic investigation into the effectiveness of randomization techniques designed for hardening outdated binaries. We studied various state-of-the-art, fine-grained randomization tools, confirming that all of them can leave a certain part of the retrofitted binary code still reusable. To quantify the risks, we proposed a set of concrete criteria to classify gadgets immune to rewriting-based randomization and investigated their availability and capability.
2019-10-14
Li, W., Ma, Y., Yang, Q., Li, M..  2018.  Hardware-Based Adversary-Controlled States Tracking. 2018 IEEE 4th International Conference on Computer and Communications (ICCC). :1366–1370.

Return Oriented Programming is one of the most important software security challenges nowadays. It exploits memory vulnerabilities to control the state of the program and hijacks its control flow. Existing defenses usually focus on how to protect the control flow or face the challenge of how to maintain the taint markings for memory data. In this paper, we directly focus on the adversary-controlled states, simplify the classic dynamic taint analysis method to only track registers and propose Hardware-based Adversary-controlled States Tracking (HAST). HAST dynamically tracks registers that may be controlled by the adversary to detect ROP attack. It is transparent to user application and makes few modifications to existing hardware. Our evaluation demonstrates that HAST will introduce almost no performance overhead and can effectively detect ROP attacks without false positives on the tested common Linux applications.