Biblio

Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) promise to be a critical hardware primitive to provide unique identities to billions of connected devices in Internet of Things (IoTs). In traditional authentication protocols a user presents a set of credentials with an accompanying proof such as password or digital certificate. However, IoTs need more evolved methods as these classical techniques suffer from the pressing problems of password dependency and inability to bind access requests to the “things” from which they originate. Additionally, the protocols need to be lightweight and heterogeneous. Although PUFs seem promising to develop such mechanism, it puts forward an open problem of how to develop such mechanism without needing to store the secret challenge-response pair (CRP) explicitly at the verifier end. In this paper, we develop an authentication and key exchange protocol by combining the ideas of Identity based Encryption (IBE), PUFs and Key-ed Hash Function to show that this combination can help to do away with this requirement. The security of the protocol is proved formally under the Session Key Security and the Universal Composability Framework. A prototype of the protocol has been implemented to realize a secured video surveillance camera using a combination of an Intel Edison board, with a Digilent Nexys-4 FPGA board consisting of an Artix-7 FPGA, together serving as the IoT node. We show, though the stand-alone video camera can be subjected to man-in-the-middle attack via IP-spoofing using standard network penetration tools, the camera augmented with the proposed protocol resists such attacks and it suits aptly in an IoT infrastructure making the protocol deployable for the industry.

In this work we present a novel technique for physical layer security in the Internet-of-Things (IoT) networks. In the proposed architecture, each IoT node generates a phase-modulated random key/data and transmits it to a master node in the presence of an eavesdropper, referred to as Eve. The master node, simultaneously, broadcasts a high power signal using an omni-directional antenna, which is received as interference by Eve. This interference masks the generated key by the IoT node and will result in a higher bit-error rate in the data received by Eve. The two legitimate intended nodes communicate in a full-duplex manner and, consequently, subtract their transmitted signals, as a known reference, from the received signal (self-interference cancellation). We compare our proposed method with a conventional approach to physical layer security based on directional antennas. In particular, we show, using theoretical and measurement results, that our proposed approach provides significantly better security measures, in terms bit error rate (BER) at Eve's location. Also, it is proven that in our novel system, the possible eavesdropping region, defined by the region with BER \textbackslashtextless; 10-1, is always smaller than the reliable communication region with BER \textbackslashtextless; 10-3.

With the development of large scale integrated circuits, the functions of the IoT chips have been increasingly perfect. The verification work has become one of the most important aspects. On the one hand, an efficient verification platform can ensure the correctness of the design. On the other hand, it can shorten the chip design cycle and reduce the design cost. In this paper, based on a transmission protocol of the IoT node, we propose a verification method which combines simulation verification and FPGA-based prototype verification. We also constructed a system verification platform for the IoT smart node chip combining two kinds of verification above. We have simulated and verificatied the related functions of the node chip using this platform successfully. It has a great reference value.