Biblio

A time-delay switch (TDS) cyber attack is a deliberate attempt by malicious adversaries aiming at destabilizing a power system by impeding the communication signals to/from the centralized controller from/to the network sensors and generating stations that participate in the load frequency control (LFC). A TDS cyber attack can be targeting the sensing loops (transmitting network measurements to the centralized controller) or the control signals dispatched from the centralized controller to the governor valves of the generating stations. A resilient TDS control strategy is proposed and developed in this work that thwarts network instabilities that are caused by delays in the sensing loops, and control commands, and guarantees normal operation of the LFC mechanism. This will be achieved by augmenting the telemetered control commands with locally generated feedback control laws (i.e., “decentralized” control commands) taking measurements that are available and accessible at the power generating stations (locally) independent from all the telemetered signals to/from the centralized controller. Our objective is to devise a controller that is capable of circumventing all types of TDS and DoS (Denial of Service) cyber attacks as well as a broad class of False Data Injection (FDI) cyber attacks.

Researchers develop bioassays following rigorous experimentation in the lab that involves considerable fiscal and highly-skilled-person-hour investment. Previous work shows that a bioassay implementation can be reverse engineered by using images or video and control signals of the biochip. Hence, techniques must be devised to protect the intellectual property (IP) rights of the bioassay developer. This study is the first step in this direction and it makes the following contributions: (1) it introduces use of a sieve-valve as a security primitive to obfuscate bioassay implementations; (2) it shows how sieve-valves can be used to obscure biochip building blocks such as multiplexers and mixers; (3) it presents design rules and security metrics to design and measure obfuscated biochips. We assess the cost-security trade-offs associated with this solution and demonstrate practical sieve-valve based obfuscation on real-life biochips.

The prevalent use of mobile applications using location information to improve the quality of their service has arisen privacy issues, particularly regarding the extraction of user's points on interest. Many studies in the literature focus on presenting algorithms that allow to protect the user of such applications. However, these solutions often require a high level of expertise to be understood and tuned properly. In this paper, the first control-based approach of this problem is presented. The protection algorithm is considered as the ``physical'' plant and its parameters as control signals that enable to guarantee privacy despite user's mobility pattern. The following of the paper presents the first control formulation of POI-related privacy measure, as well as dynamic modeling and a simple yet efficient PI control strategy. The evaluation using simulated mobility records shows the relevance and efficiency of the presented approach.