Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Keyword is high-level abstractions  [Clear All Filters]
2021-02-08
Zhang, J..  2020.  DeepMal: A CNN-LSTM Model for Malware Detection Based on Dynamic Semantic Behaviours. 2020 International Conference on Computer Information and Big Data Applications (CIBDA). :313–316.
Malware refers to any software accessing or being installed in a system without the authorisation of administrators. Various malware has been widely used for cyber-criminals to accomplish their evil intentions and goals. To combat the increasing amount and reduce the threat of malicious programs, a novel deep learning framework, which uses NLP techniques for reference, combines CNN and LSTM neurones to capture the locally spatial correlations and learn from sequential longterm dependency is proposed. Hence, high-level abstractions and representations are automatically extracted for the malware classification task. The classification accuracy improves from 0.81 (best one by Random Forest) to approximately 1.0.
2020-01-20
Gollamudi, Anitha, Chong, Stephen, Arden, Owen.  2019.  Information Flow Control for Distributed Trusted Execution Environments. 2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). :304–30414.

Distributed applications cannot assume that their security policies will be enforced on untrusted hosts. Trusted execution environments (TEEs) combined with cryptographic mechanisms enable execution of known code on an untrusted host and the exchange of confidential and authenticated messages with it. TEEs do not, however, establish the trustworthiness of code executing in a TEE. Thus, developing secure applications using TEEs requires specialized expertise and careful auditing. This paper presents DFLATE, a core security calculus for distributed applications with TEEs. DFLATE offers high-level abstractions that reflect both the guarantees and limitations of the underlying security mechanisms they are based on. The accuracy of these abstractions is exhibited by asymmetry between confidentiality and integrity in our formal results: DFLATE enforces a strong form of noninterference for confidentiality, but only a weak form for integrity. This reflects the asymmetry of the security guarantees of a TEE: a malicious host cannot access secrets in the TEE or modify its contents, but they can suppress or manipulate the sequence of its inputs and outputs. Therefore DFLATE cannot protect against the suppression of high-integrity messages, but when these messages are delivered, their contents cannot have been influenced by an attacker.