Biblio
Advance persistent threat is a primary security concerns to the big organizations and its technical infrastructure, from cyber criminals seeking personal and financial information to state sponsored attacks designed to disrupt, compromising infrastructure, sidestepping security efforts thus causing serious damage to organizations. A skilled cybercriminal using multiple attack vectors and entry points navigates around the defenses, evading IDS/Firewall detection and breaching the network in no time. To understand the big picture, this paper analyses an approach to advanced persistent threat by doing the same things the bad guys do on a network setup. We will walk through various steps from foot-printing and reconnaissance, scanning networks, gaining access, maintaining access to finally clearing tracks, as in a real world attack. We will walk through different attack tools and exploits used in each phase and comparative study on their effectiveness, along with explaining their attack vectors and its countermeasures. We will conclude the paper by explaining the factors which actually qualify to be an Advance Persistent Threat.
Military communities have come to rely heavily on commercial off the shelf (COTS) standards and technologies for Internet of Things (IoT) operations. One of the major obstacles to military use of COTS IoT devices is the security of data transfer. In this paper, we successfully design and develop a lightweight, trust-based security architecture to support routing in a mobile IoT network. Specifically, we modify the RPL IoT routing algorithm using common security techniques, including a nonce identity value, timestamp, and network whitelist. Our approach allows RPL to select a routing path over a mobile IoT wireless network based on a computed node trust value and average received signal strength indicator (ARSSI) value across network members. We conducted simulations using the Cooja network simulator and Wireshark to validate the algorithm against stipulated threat models. We demonstrate that our algorithm can protect the network against Denial of Service (DoS) and Sybil based identity attacks. We also show that the control overhead required for our algorithm is less than 5% and that the packet delivery rate improves by nearly 10%.