Biblio

The Industrial Internet-of-Things (IIoT) has gained significant interest from both the research and industry communities. Such interest came with a vision towards enabling automation and intelligence for futuristic versions of our day to day devices. However, such a vision demands the need for accelerated research and development of IIoT systems, in which sensor integration, due to their diversity, impose a significant roadblock. Such roadblocks are embodied in both the cost and time to develop an IIoT platform, imposing limits on the innovation of sensor manufacturers, as a result of the demand to maintain interface compatibility for seamless integration and low development costs. In this paper, we propose an IIoT system architecture (SandBoxer) tailored for sensor integration, that utilizes a collaborative set of efforts from various technologies and research fields. The paper introduces the concept of ”development-sandboxing” as a viable choice towards building the foundation for enabling true-plug-and-play IIoT. We start by outlining the key characteristics desired to create an architecture that catalyzes IIoT research and development. We then present our vision of the architecture through the use of a sensor-hosted EEPROM and scripting to ”sandbox” the sensors, which in turn accelerates sensor integration for developers and creates a broader innovation path for sensor manufacturers. We also discuss multiple design alternative, challenges, and use cases in both the research and industry.

Industrial Internet-of-Things has been touted as the next revolution in the industrial domain, offering interconnectivity, independence, real-time operation, and self-optimization. Integration of smart systems, however, bridges the gap between information and operation technology, creating new avenues for attacks from the cyber domain. The dismantling of this air-gap, in conjunction with the devices' long lifespan -in the range of 20-30 years-, motivates us to bring the attention of the community to emerging advanced persistent threats. We demonstrate a threat that bridges the air-gap by leaking data from memory to analog peripherals through Direct Memory Access (DMA), delivered as a firmware modification through the supply chain. The attack automatically adapts to a target device by leveraging the Device Tree and resides solely in the peripherals, completely transparent to the main CPU, by judiciously short-circuiting specific components. We implement this attack on a commercial Programmable Logic Controller, leaking information over the available LEDs. We evaluate the presented attack vector in terms of stealthiness, and demonstrate no observable overhead on both CPU performance and DMA transfer speed. Since traditional anomaly detection techniques would fail to detect this firmware trojan, this work highlights the need for industrial control system-appropriate techniques that can be applied promptly to installed devices.