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2020-07-24
Selar, G Dheeraj, Apoorva, P.  2017.  Comparative study on KP-ABE and CP-ABE algorithm for secure data retrieval in military network. 2017 International Conference on Intelligent Computing and Control (I2C2). :1—4.

In many hostile military environments for instance war zone, unfriendly nature, etc., the systems perform on the specially promoted mode and nature which they tolerate the defined system network architecture. Preparation of Disruption-Tolerant systems (DTN) enhances the network between the remote devices which provided to the soldiers in the war zone, this situation conveys the reliable data transmission under scanner. Cipher text approach are based on the attribute based encryption which mainly acts on the attributes or role of the users, which is a successful cryptographic strategy to maintain the control issues and also allow reliable data transfer. Specially, the systems are not centralized and have more data constrained issues in the systems, implementing the Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) was an important issue, where this strategy provides the new security and data protection approach with the help of the Key Revocation, Key Escrows and collaboration of the certain attributes with help of main Key Authorities. This paper mainly concentrates on the reliable data retrieval system with the help of CP-ABE for the Disruption-Tolerant Networks where multiple key authorities deal with respective attributes safely and securely. We performed comparison analysis on existing schemes with the recommended system components which are configured in the respective decentralized tolerant military system for reliable data retrieval.

2020-03-18
Djoko, Judicael B., Lange, Jack, Lee, Adam J..  2019.  NeXUS: Practical and Secure Access Control on Untrusted Storage Platforms using Client-Side SGX. 2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN). :401–413.

With the rising popularity of file-sharing services such as Google Drive and Dropbox in the workflows of individuals and corporations alike, the protection of client-outsourced data from unauthorized access or tampering remains a major security concern. Existing cryptographic solutions to this problem typically require server-side support, involve non-trivial key management on the part of users, and suffer from severe re-encryption penalties upon access revocations. This combination of performance overheads and management burdens makes this class of solutions undesirable in situations where performant, platform-agnostic, dynamic sharing of user content is required. We present NEXUS, a stackable filesystem that leverages trusted hardware to provide confidentiality and integrity for user files stored on untrusted platforms. NEXUS is explicitly designed to balance security, portability, and performance: it supports dynamic sharing of protected volumes on any platform exposing a file access API without requiring server-side support, enables the use of fine-grained access control policies to allow for selective sharing, and avoids the key revocation and file re-encryption overheads associated with other cryptographic approaches to access control. This combination of features is made possible by the use of a client-side Intel SGX enclave that is used to protect and share NEXUS volumes, ensuring that cryptographic keys never leave enclave memory and obviating the need to reencrypt files upon revocation of access rights. We implemented a NEXUS prototype that runs on top of the AFS filesystem and show that it incurs ×2 overhead for a variety of common file and database operations.