Visible to the public Biblio

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2020-04-24
Shuvro, Rezoan A., Das, Pankaz, Hayat, Majeed M., Talukder, Mitun.  2019.  Predicting Cascading Failures in Power Grids using Machine Learning Algorithms. 2019 North American Power Symposium (NAPS). :1—6.
Although there has been notable progress in modeling cascading failures in power grids, few works included using machine learning algorithms. In this paper, cascading failures that lead to massive blackouts in power grids are predicted and classified into no, small, and large cascades using machine learning algorithms. Cascading-failure data is generated using a cascading failure simulator framework developed earlier. The data set includes the power grid operating parameters such as loading level, level of load shedding, the capacity of the failed lines, and the topological parameters such as edge betweenness centrality and the average shortest distance for numerous combinations of two transmission line failures as features. Then several machine learning algorithms are used to classify cascading failures. Further, linear regression is used to predict the number of failed transmission lines and the amount of load shedding during a cascade based on initial feature values. This data-driven technique can be used to generate cascading failure data set for any real-world power grids and hence, power-grid engineers can use this approach for cascade data generation and hence predicting vulnerabilities and enhancing robustness of the grid.
Ha, Dinh Truc, Retière, Nicolas, Caputo, Jean-Guy.  2019.  A New Metric to Quantify the Vulnerability of Power Grids. 2019 International Conference on System Science and Engineering (ICSSE). :206—213.
Major blackouts are due to cascading failures in power systems. These failures usually occur at vulnerable links of the network. To identify these, indicators have already been defined using complex network theory. However, most of these indicators only depend on the topology of the grid; they fail to detect the weak links. We introduce a new metric to identify the vulnerable lines, based on the load-flow equations and the grid geometry. Contrary to the topological indicators, ours is built from the electrical equations and considers the location and magnitude of the loads and of the power generators. We apply this new metric to the IEEE 118-bus system and compare its prediction of weak links to the ones given by an industrial software. The agreement is very well and shows that using our indicator a simple examination of the network and its generator and load distribution suffices to find the weak lines.
Gao, Boyo, Shi, Libao, Ni, Yixin.  2019.  A dynamic defense-attack game scheme with incomplete information for vulnerability analysis in a cyber-physical power infrastructure. 8th Renewable Power Generation Conference (RPG 2019). :1—8.
The modern power system is experiencing rapid development towards a smarter cyber-physical power grid. How to comprehensively and effectively identify the vulnerable components under various cyber attacks has attracted widespread interest and attention around the world. In this paper, a game-theoretical scheme is developed to analyze the vulnerabilities of transmission lines and cyber elements under locally coordinated cyber-physical attacks in a cyber-physical power infrastructure. A two-step scenario including resources allocation made by system defender in advance and subsequent coordinated cyber-physical attacks are designed elaborately. The designed scenario is modeled as a game of incomplete information, which is then converted into a bi-level mathematical programming problem. In the lower level model, the attacker aims at maximizing system losses by attacking some transmission lines. While in the higher level model, the defender allocates defensive resources, trying to maximally reduce the losses considering the possible attacks. The payoffs of the game are calculated by leveraging a strategy of searching accident chains caused by cascading failure analyzed in this paper. A particle swarm optimization algorithm is applied to solve the proposed nonlinear bi-level programming model, and the case studies on a 34-bus system are conducted to verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
Tuttle, Michael, Wicker, Braden, Poshtan, Majid, Callenes, Joseph.  2019.  Algorithmic Approaches to Characterizing Power Flow Cyber-Attack Vulnerabilities. 2019 IEEE Power Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT). :1—5.
As power grid control systems become increasingly automated and distributed, security has become a significant design concern. Systems increasingly expose new avenues, at a variety of levels, for attackers to exploit and enable widespread disruptions and/or surveillance. Much prior work has explored the implications of attack models focused on false data injection at the front-end of the control system (i.e. during state estimation) [1]. Instead, in this paper we focus on characterizing the inherent cyber-attack vulnerabilities with power flow. Power flow (and power flow constraints) are at the core of many applications critical to operation of power grids (e.g. state estimation, economic dispatch, contingency analysis, etc.). We propose two algorithmic approaches for characterizing the vulnerability of buses within power grids to cyber-attacks. Specifically, we focus on measuring the instability of power flow to attacks which manifest as either voltage or power related errors. Our results show that attacks manifesting as voltage errors are an order of magnitude more likely to cause instability than attacks manifesting as power related errors (and 5x more likely for state estimation as compared to power flow).
Jiang, He, Wang, Zhenhua, He, Haibo.  2019.  An Evolutionary Computation Approach for Smart Grid Cascading Failure Vulnerability Analysis. 2019 IEEE Symposium Series on Computational Intelligence (SSCI). :332—338.
The cyber-physical security of smart grid is of great importance since it directly concerns the normal operating of a system. Recently, researchers found that organized sequential attacks can incur large-scale cascading failure to the smart grid. In this paper, we focus on the line-switching sequential attack, where the attacker aims to trip transmission lines in a designed order to cause significant system failures. Our objective is to identify the critical line-switching attack sequence, which can be instructional for the protection of smart grid. For this purpose, we develop an evolutionary computation based vulnerability analysis framework, which employs particle swarm optimization to search the critical attack sequence. Simulation studies on two benchmark systems, i.e., IEEE 24 bus reliability test system and Washington 30 bus dynamic test system, are implemented to evaluate the performance of our proposed method. Simulation results show that our method can yield a better performance comparing with the reinforcement learning based approach proposed in other prior work.
Pan, Huan, Lian, Honghui, Na, Chunning.  2019.  Vulnerability Analysis of Smart Grid under Community Attack Style. IECON 2019 - 45th Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society. 1:5971—5976.
The smart grid consists of two parts, one is the physical power grid, the other is the information network. In order to study the cascading failure, the vulnerability analysis of the smart grid is done under a kind of community attack style in this paper. Two types of information networks are considered, i.e. topology consistency and scale-free cyber networks, respectively. The concept of control center is presented and the controllable power nodes and observable power lines are defined. Minimum load reduction model(MLRM) is given and described as a linear programming problem. A index is introduced to assess the vulnerability. New England 39 nodes system is applied to simulate the cascading failure process to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed MLRM where community the attack methods include attack the power lines among and in power communities.
Jianfeng, Dai, Jian, Qiu, Jing, Wu, Xuesong, Wang.  2019.  A Vulnerability Assessment Method of Cyber Physical Power System Considering Power-Grid Infrastructures Failure. 2019 IEEE Sustainable Power and Energy Conference (iSPEC). :1492—1496.
In order to protect power grid network, the security assessment techniques which include both cyber side and the physical side should be considered. In this paper, we present a method for evaluating the dynamic vulnerability of cyber-physical power system (CPPS) considering the power grid infrastructures failure. First, according to the functional characteristics of different components, the impact of a single component function failure on CPPS operation is analyzed and quantified, such as information components, communication components and power components; then, the dynamic vulnerability of multiple components synchronization function failure is calculated, and the full probability evaluation formula of CPPS operational dynamic vulnerability is built; Thirdly, from an attacker's perspective to identify the most hazardous component combinations for CPPS multi-node collaborative attack; Finally, a local CPPS model is established based on the IEEE-9 bus system to quantify its operational dynamic vulnerability, and the effectiveness of proposed method is verified.