Biblio

Conducting active cyberdefense requires the acceptance of a proactive framework that acknowledges the lack of predictable symmetries between malicious actors and their capabilities and intent. Unlike physical weapons such as firearms, naval vessels, and piloted aircraft-all of which risk physical exposure when engaged in direct combat-cyberweapons can be deployed (often without their victims' awareness) under the protection of the anonymity inherent in cyberspace. Furthermore, it is difficult in the cyber domain to determine with accuracy what a malicious actor may target and what type of cyberweapon the actor may wield. These aspects imply an advantage for malicious actors in cyberspace that is greater than for those in any other domain, as the malicious cyberactor, under current international constructs and norms, has the ability to choose the time, place, and weapon of engagement. This being said, if defenders are to successfully repel attempted intrusions, then they must conduct an active cyberdefense within a framework that proactively engages threatening actions independent of a requirement to achieve attribution. This paper proposes that private business, government personnel, and cyberdefenders must develop a threat identification framework that does not depend upon attribution of the malicious actor, i.e., an attribution agnostic cyberdefense construct. Furthermore, upon developing this framework, network defenders must deploy internally based cyberthreat countermeasures that take advantage of defensive network environmental variables and alter the calculus of nefarious individuals in cyberspace. Only by accomplishing these two objectives can the defenders of cyberspace actively combat malicious agents within the virtual realm.