Biblio
Today our world benefits from Internet of Things (IoT) technology; however, new security problems arise when these IoT devices are introduced into our homes. Because many of these IoT devices have access to the Internet and they have little to no security, they make our smart homes highly vulnerable to compromise. Some of the threats include IoT botnets and generic confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) attacks. Our research explores botnet detection by experimenting with supervised machine learning and deep-learning classifiers. Further, our approach assesses classifier performance on unbalanced datasets that contain benign data, mixed in with small amounts of malicious data. We demonstrate that the classifiers can separate malicious activity from benign activity within a small IoT network dataset. The classifiers can also separate malicious activity from benign activity in increasingly larger datasets. Our experiments have demonstrated incremental improvement in results for (1) accuracy, (2) probability of detection, and (3) probability of false alarm. The best performance results include 99.9% accuracy, 99.8% probability of detection, and 0% probability of false alarm. This paper also demonstrates how the performance of these classifiers increases, as IoT training datasets become larger and larger.
Through analysis of sessions in which files were created and downloaded on three Cowrie SSH/Telnet honeypots, we find that IoT botnets are by far the most common source of malware on connected systems with weak credentials. We detail our honeypot configuration and describe a simple method for listing near-identical malicious login sessions using edit distance. A large number of IoT botnets attack our honeypots, but the malicious sessions which download botnet software to the honeypot are almost all nearly identical to one of two common attack patterns. It is apparent that the Mirai worm is still the dominant botnet software, but has been expanded and modified by other hackers. We also find that the same loader devices deploy several different botnet malware strains to the honeypot over the course of a 40 day period, suggesting multiple botnet deployments from the same source. We conclude that Mirai continues to be adapted but can be effectively tracked using medium interaction honeypots such as Cowrie.
With the tremendous growth of IoT botnet DDoS attacks in recent years, IoT security has now become one of the most concerned topics in the field of network security. A lot of security approaches have been proposed in the area, but they still lack in terms of dealing with newer emerging variants of IoT malware, known as Zero-Day Attacks. In this paper, we present a honeypot-based approach which uses machine learning techniques for malware detection. The IoT honeypot generated data is used as a dataset for the effective and dynamic training of a machine learning model. The approach can be taken as a productive outset towards combatting Zero-Day DDoS Attacks which now has emerged as an open challenge in defending IoT against DDoS Attacks.