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2022-03-08
Choucri, Nazli, Agarwal, Gaurav.  2021.  Complexity of International Law for Cyber Operations. 2021 IEEE International Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST). :1–7.
Policy documents are usually written in text form— word after word, sentence after sentence etc.—which often obscures some of their most critical features. Text cannot easily situate interconnections among elements, or identify feedback, nor reveal other embedded features. This paper presents a computational approach to International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 2.0, Tallinn Manual, a seminal work of 600 pages at the intersection of law and cyberspace. The results identify the dominance of specific Rules, the centrality of select Rules, and Rules with autonomous standing, as well as the feedback structure that holds the system together. None of these features are evident from the text alone.
2015-05-04
Caso, J.S..  2014.  The rules of engagement for cyber-warfare and the Tallinn Manual: A case study. Cyber Technology in Automation, Control, and Intelligent Systems (CYBER), 2014 IEEE 4th Annual International Conference on. :252-257.

Documents such as the Geneva (1949) and Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) that have clearly outlined the rules of engagement for warfare find themselves challenged by the presence of a new arena: cyber. Considering the potential nature of these offenses, operations taking place in the realm of cyber cannot simply be generalized as “cyber-warfare,” as they may also be acts of cyber-espionage, cyber-terrorism, cyber-sabaotge, etc. Cyber-attacks, such as those on Estonia in 2007, have begun to test the limits of NATO's Article 5 and the UN Charter's Article 2(4) against the use of force. What defines “force” as it relates to cyber, and what kind of response is merited in the case of uncertainty regarding attribution? In 2009, NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence commissioned a group of experts to publish a study on the application of international law to cyber-warfare. This document, the Tallinn Manual, was published in 2013 as a non-binding exercise to stimulate discussion on the codification of international law on the subject. After analysis, this paper concludes that the Tallinn Manual classifies the 2010 Stuxnet attack on Iran's nuclear program as an illegal act of force. The purpose of this paper is the following: (1) to analyze the historical and technical background of cyber-warfare, (2) to evaluate the Tallinn Manual as it relates to the justification cyber-warfare, and (3) to examine the applicability of the Tallinn Manual in a case study of a historical example of a cyber-attacks.
 

Watney, M..  2014.  Challenges pertaining to cyber war under international law. Cyber Security, Cyber Warfare and Digital Forensic (CyberSec), 2014 Third International Conference on. :1-5.

State-level intrusion in the cyberspace of another country seriously threatens a state's peace and security. Consequently many types of cyberspace intrusion are being referred to as cyber war with scant regard to the legal position under international law. This is but one of the challenges facing state-level cyber intrusion. The current rules of international law prohibit certain types of intrusion. However, international law does not define which intrusion fall within the prohibited category of intrusion nor when the threshold of intrusion is surpassed. International lawyers have to determine the type of intrusion and threshold on a case-by-case basis. The Tallinn Manual may serve as guideline in this assessment, but determination of the type of intrusion and attribution to a specific state is not easily established. The current rules of international law do not prohibit all intrusion which on statelevel may be highly invasive and destructive. Unrestrained cyber intrusion may result in cyberspace becoming a battle space in which state(s) with strong cyber abilities dominate cyberspace resulting in resentment and fear among other states. The latter may be prevented on an international level by involving all states on an equal and transparent manner in cyberspace governance.