Biblio

Air-gapped networks are isolated from the Internet, since they store and process sensitive information. It has been shown that attackers can exfiltrate data from air-gapped networks by sending acoustic signals generated by computer speakers, however this type of covert channel relies on the existence of loudspeakers in the air-gapped environment. In this paper, we present CD-LEAK - a novel acoustic covert channel that works in constrained environments where loudspeakers are not available to the attacker. Malware installed on a compromised computer can maliciously generate acoustic signals via the optical CD/DVD drives. Binary information can then be modulated over the acoustic signals and be picked up by a nearby Internet connected receiver (e.g., a workstation, hidden microphone, smartphone, laptop, etc.). We examine CD/DVD drives and discuss their acoustical characteristics. We also present signal generation and detection, and data modulation and demodulation algorithms. Based on our proposed method, we developed a transmitter and receiver for PCs and smartphones, and provide the design and implementation details. We examine the channel and evaluate it on various optical drives. We also provide a set of countermeasures against this threat - which has been overlooked.

Critical infrastructures of all countries unites common cyberspace. In this space, there are many threats that can disrupt the security of critical infrastructure in one country, but also cause damage in other countries. This is a reality that makes it necessary to agree on intergovernmental national views on the composition of critical infrastructures, an assessment of their security and protection. The article presents an overview of views on critical infrastructures of the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation, the purpose of which is to develop common positions.