Visible to the public Biblio

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2020-09-04
Carpentier, Eleonore, Thomasset, Corentin, Briffaut, Jeremy.  2019.  Bridging The Gap: Data Exfiltration In Highly Secured Environments Using Bluetooth IoTs. 2019 IEEE 37th International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD). :297—300.
IoT devices introduce unprecedented threats into home and professional networks. As they fail to adhere to security best practices, they are broadly exploited by malicious actors to build botnets or steal sensitive information. Their adoption challenges established security standard as classic security measures are often inappropriate to secure them. This is even more problematic in sensitive environments where the presence of insecure IoTs can be exploited to bypass strict security policies. In this paper, we demonstrate an attack against a highly secured network using a Bluetooth smart bulb. This attack allows a malicious actor to take advantage of a smart bulb to exfiltrate data from an air gapped network.
2020-07-16
Farivar, Faezeh, Haghighi, Mohammad Sayad, Barchinezhad, Soheila, Jolfaei, Alireza.  2019.  Detection and Compensation of Covert Service-Degrading Intrusions in Cyber Physical Systems through Intelligent Adaptive Control. 2019 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Technology (ICIT). :1143—1148.

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are playing important roles in the critical infrastructure now. A prominent family of CPSs are networked control systems in which the control and feedback signals are carried over computer networks like the Internet. Communication over insecure networks make system vulnerable to cyber attacks. In this article, we design an intrusion detection and compensation framework based on system/plant identification to fight covert attacks. We collect error statistics of the output estimation during the learning phase of system operation and after that, monitor the system behavior to see if it significantly deviates from the expected outputs. A compensating controller is further designed to intervene and replace the classic controller once the attack is detected. The proposed model is tested on a DC motor as the plant and is put against a deception signal amplification attack over the forward link. Simulation results show that the detection algorithm well detects the intrusion and the compensator is also successful in alleviating the attack effects.