Biblio

This paper explores an innovative approach to the telerobotics reasoning architecture and networking, which offer a reliable and adaptable operational process for complex tasks. There are many operational challenges in the remote control for manufacturing that can be introduced by the network communications and Iatency. A new protocol, named compact Reliable UDP (compact-RUDP), has been developed to combine both data channelling and media streaming for robot teleoperation. The original approach ensures connection reliability by implementing a TCP-like sliding window with UDP packets. The protocol provides multiple features including data security, link status monitoring, bandwidth control, asynchronous file transfer and prioritizing transfer of data packets. Experiments were conducted on a 5DOF robotic arm where a cutting tool was mounted at its distal end. A light sensor was used to guide the robot movements, and a camera device to provide a video stream of the operation. The data communication reliability is evaluated using Round-Trip Time (RTT), and advanced robot path planning for distributed decision making between endpoints. The results show 88% correlation between the remotely and locally operated robots. The file transfers and video streaming were performed with no data loss or corruption on the control commands and data feedback packets.

Using the keyboard LEDs to send data optically was proposed in 2002 by Loughry and Umphress [1] (Appendix A). In this paper we extensively explore this threat in the context of a modern cyber-attack with current hardware and optical equipment. In this type of attack, an advanced persistent threat (APT) uses the keyboard LEDs (Caps-Lock, Num-Lock and Scroll-Lock) to encode information and exfiltrate data from airgapped computers optically. Notably, this exfiltration channel is not monitored by existing data leakage prevention (DLP) systems. We examine this attack and its boundaries for today's keyboards with USB controllers and sensitive optical sensors. We also introduce smartphone and smartwatch cameras as components of malicious insider and 'evil maid' attacks. We provide the necessary scientific background on optical communication and the characteristics of modern USB keyboards at the hardware and software level, and present a transmission protocol and modulation schemes. We implement the exfiltration malware, discuss its design and implementation issues, and evaluate it with different types of keyboards. We also test various receivers, including light sensors, remote cameras, 'extreme' cameras, security cameras, and smartphone cameras. Our experiment shows that data can be leaked from air-gapped computers via the keyboard LEDs at a maximum bit rate of 3000 bit/sec per LED given a light sensor as a receiver, and more than 120 bit/sec if smartphones are used. The attack doesn't require any modification of the keyboard at hardware or firmware levels.