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2023-04-14
Sadlek, Lukáš, Čeleda, Pavel, Tovarňák, Daniel.  2022.  Identification of Attack Paths Using Kill Chain and Attack Graphs. NOMS 2022-2022 IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium. :1–6.
The ever-evolving capabilities of cyber attackers force security administrators to focus on the early identification of emerging threats. Targeted cyber attacks usually consist of several phases, from initial reconnaissance of the network environment to final impact on objectives. This paper investigates the identification of multi-step cyber threat scenarios using kill chain and attack graphs. Kill chain and attack graphs are threat modeling concepts that enable determining weak security defense points. We propose a novel kill chain attack graph that merges kill chain and attack graphs together. This approach determines possible chains of attacker’s actions and their materialization within the protected network. The graph generation uses a categorization of threats according to violated security properties. The graph allows determining the kill chain phase the administrator should focus on and applicable countermeasures to mitigate possible cyber threats. We implemented the proposed approach for a predefined range of cyber threats, especially vulnerability exploitation and network threats. The approach was validated on a real-world use case. Publicly available implementation contains a proof-of-concept kill chain attack graph generator.
ISSN: 2374-9709
2021-03-17
Fu, T., Zhen, W., Qian, X. Z..  2020.  A Study of Evaluation Methods of WEB Security Threats Based on Multi-stage Attack. 2020 IEEE International Conference on Information Technology,Big Data and Artificial Intelligence (ICIBA). 1:1457—1461.
Web application services have gradually become an important support of Internet services, but are also facing increasingly serious security problems. It is extremely necessary to evaluate the security of Web application services to deal with attacks against them effectively. In this paper, in view of the characteristics of the current attack of Web application services, a Web security analysis model based on the kill chain is established, and the possible attacks against Web application services are analyzed in depth from the perspective of the kill chain. Then, the security of Web application services is evaluated in a quantitative manner. In this way, it can make up the defects of insufficient inspection by the existing security vulnerability model and the security specification of the tracking of Web application services, so as to realize the objective and scientific evaluation of the security state of Web application services.
2020-08-28
Duncan, Adrian, Creese, Sadie, Goldsmith, Michael.  2019.  A Combined Attack-Tree and Kill-Chain Approach to Designing Attack-Detection Strategies for Malicious Insiders in Cloud Computing. 2019 International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services (Cyber Security). :1—9.

Attacks on cloud-computing services are becoming more prevalent with recent victims including Tesla, Aviva Insurance and SIM-card manufacturer Gemalto[1]. The risk posed to organisations from malicious insiders is becoming more widely known about and consequently many are now investing in hardware, software and new processes to try to detect these attacks. As for all types of attack vector, there will always be those which are not known about and those which are known about but remain exceptionally difficult to detect - particularly in a timely manner. We believe that insider attacks are of particular concern in a cloud-computing environment, and that cloud-service providers should enhance their ability to detect them by means of indirect detection. We propose a combined attack-tree and kill-chain based method for identifying multiple indirect detection measures. Specifically, the use of attack trees enables us to encapsulate all detection opportunities for insider attacks in cloud-service environments. Overlaying the attack tree on top of a kill chain in turn facilitates indirect detection opportunities higher-up the tree as well as allowing the provider to determine how far an attack has progressed once suspicious activity is detected. We demonstrate the method through consideration of a specific type of insider attack - that of attempting to capture virtual machines in transit within a cloud cluster via use of a network tap, however, the process discussed here applies equally to all cloud paradigms.